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The purpose of this study is to show how a possible philosophy of life can 
arise by following Bergson’s method of intuition and to make emphasis on 
how Bergson’s two fundamental notions (intuition and duration) are capable 
of grasping the flux of life.  The scientific methods, static concepts and classical 
philosophy are not able to understand the flow of life. Throughout this study it 
is pointed out a possible philosophy that is able to grasp the flow and the 
evolution of life.  For this aim, Bergson’s method of intuition is investigated 
and the difference between the method of intuition and analysis is pointed out. 
Then, the evolution of intuition and its relation with instinct and intellect are 
examined. Moreover, the significance of duration and its difference from 
mathematical time are analyzed. Finally, the relations between intuition, 
duration and life are examined.  
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Bu çalışmanın amacı, Bergson’un sezgi metodu izlenerek nasıl bir olanaklı 
yaşam felsefesinin ortaya çıkabileceğini göstermek ve Bergson’un iki temel 
nosyonu olan sezgi ve dureé’nin akış ve değişim içerisinde olan yaşamı 
anlamaya nasıl muktedir olduğuna vurgu yapmaktır. Bilimsel metodlar, statik 
kavramlar ve klasik felsefe yaşamın akışını anlamaya yetkin değillerdir. Bu 
çalışmada yaşamın akışını ve gelişim sürecini anlamaya yatkın bir felsefenin 
mümkün olabileceği fikrine vurgu yapılmaya çalışılmıştır. Bu amaç 
doğrultusunda öncelikle Bergson’un sezgi metodu incelenecek ve analiz 
metoduyla olan farklılığına işaret edilmekte, ardından sezginin gelişim süreci 
ve sezgi, intelekt ve içgüdünün bu süreç içerisindeki ilişkisine 
değinilmektedir. Ayrıca durée kavramının önemi ve onun matematiksel 
zamandan farkı analiz edilmektedir. Son olarak da sezgi, durée ve yaşam 
kavramları arasındaki bağıntı incelenmektedir.  
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From the mid-19th century on, positivist philosophy had become dominant all 
over the Europe. During that period, positivist philosophers became inspired 
by scientific developments and tried to explain all philosophical problems via 
scientific methods. In contrast to that developing tendency, Bergson puts 
forward the method of intuition and elaborates a philosophy of reality that is 
far from the reality constructed by scientific methods. In this regard, Bergson's 
philosophy and his criticisms to positivists seem revolutionary against the 
domination of positivism. 
The philosophical standpoint of Henri Bergson is peculiar not because he 
poses new philosophical questions, but because he deals with common 
philosophical problems, originally rooted in the Ancient Greek thought, by 
reorganizing them in a new and unique way. 
Throughout the history of philosophy, many philosophers have regarded 
philosophy as a theoretical endeavor and have assumed science as the 
practical instrument facilitating the satisfaction of our everyday pragmatic 
necessities. According to Bergson, in time, science gained dominance over 
philosophy and imposed its positivist categories to philosophical thinking. As 
I shall discuss here, Bergson argues against these strict concepts of positivist 
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philosophy and the dominance of the scientific method. Indeed, Bergson tried 
to reinterpret philosophy that had come under the influence of positivism by 
means of ruling out the strict concepts and putting forward new dynamic 
ones. Bergson also opposes the acclaimed universality of the methods of 
positivism and offers two distinct methods for two different fields. That is, he 
offers the notion of intuition as the method of philosophy and intellect as the 
method of practical knowledge and science. 
In that respect, what makes Bergson’s philosophy distinctive is his focus on 
the concepts of intuition and intellect that had already been used in different 
ways throughout the history of philosophy. Bergson's method of intuition 
does not aim at attaining knowledge as unchanging and fixed; rather it is a 
way of knowing life in its constant state of evolution. However, this is not to 
say that Bergson ignores the possibility of absolute knowledge; instead, he 
argues that the absolute knowledge is embedded in the evolution of life and 
can only be grasped by the method of intuition. Thus, it is better to investigate 
the origin and the evolution of intuition in order (i) to understand how 
intuition makes a philosophy of life possible, and (ii) to investigate what kind 
of philosophical method intuition is.  
There are two main opposing interpretations of Bergson’s notion of intuition. 
According to the first interpretation, intuition is a non-intellectual and a 
mystical way of knowing.1 On the other hand, for the second interpretation, 
the intuition is an intellectual method of knowing reality.2 In many works of 
Bergson, there is an emphasis on spiritualism, but he does not consider himself 
as a defender of mysticism. "If by mysticism be meant (as it almost always is 
                                                          
1 See, Josiah Royce, The Problem of Christianity; D. S. Miller, M. Bergson’s Theories 
2 See, G. W.Cunningham, Bergson’s Doctrine of Intuition 
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nowadays) a reaction against positive science, the doctrine which I defend is in 
the end only a protest against mysticism."3 It must be noted here that taking 
one of these as the only true version and rejecting the other does not actually 
seem to be viable because in Bergson’s own writings, there are numerous 
assertions that stand as affirming both interpretations. In my thesis, I will not 
follow the first interpretation raising the claim of mysticism given that my 
focus will be on the methodological aspect of intuition. 
The main purpose of this thesis is to examine how Bergson’s philosophy of life 
is constituted. In this regard, I shall attempt at demonstrating the relations 
between his notions of intuition, duration and life. In each chapter of my 
study, I will concentrate on one of these notions of Bergson. Throughout this 
study my focus will be on Bergson’s works, An Introduction to Metaphysics, 
Creative Evolution and Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of 
Consciousness. The reason behind this selection is that I shall try to limit my 
research on the elemental themes (intuition, duration, life) of Bergson’s 
philosophy. 
In chapter two, I shall mostly try to examine Bergson’s philosophical method 
of intuition. The notion of intuition is significant for Bergson, not only because 
in his philosophy it appears as a method to grasp reality but also because as a 
notion it allows for an appropriate approach to the essence of the evolution of 
human life, the driving factors of which are two fundamental tendencies, 
instinct and intellect. Given these two aspects of intuition I read An 
Introduction to Metaphysics, in terms of the ways in which it conveys intuition 
as a method. He regards intuition as the unique way that enables us to attain 
absolute reality. In his work An Introduction to Metaphysics, Bergson makes 
                                                          




reference to two methods each dealing with one of the two kinds of 
knowledge, namely relative and absolute knowledge. Thus, I think that, before 
examining the philosophical method of intuition, it is important first to talk 
about the distinction between the two modes of knowledge. Second, I will 
focus on the method of analysis and the method of intuition to make clear the 
difference between them and to put forward the peculiarity of intuition. Third, 
in order to clarify the characteristics of this peculiar method, I will try to 
analyze the evolution of intuition. In this regard, I will put forth the relation of 
intuition with the tendencies of instinct and intellect. For this purpose I will 
analyze his one of the main work, Creative Evolution. Finally, I shall inquire 
into the characteristics of the method of intuition. 
The notion of duration is also one of the elemental operative term within 
Bergson’s work. In the third chapter, I shall mainly discuss significance of 
duration with reference to Bergson’s earliest work, Time and Free Will. Bergson 
defends that the confusion between the dualities such as intensity and 
extensity, quality and quantity arises from our confusion between space and 
time. Thus, Bergson uses the concept of duration to clarify the distinction 
between space and time. Duration (la durée) is a continuous flow in which 
there is no juxtaposition of events, but a succession of conscious states. Before 
making a detailed analysis of duration, I will first try to discuss the distinction 
between intensity and extensity, quality and quantity that Bergson highlights 
so as to clarify the distinction between mathematical time and duration. 
Secondly, to make clear the concept of duration, I will touch upon the 
differences between the multiplicity of conscious states and the numerical 
multiplicity. Finally, I shall review the nature of duration and investigate what 
consist in the intuition of duration.  
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The main purpose of the fourth chapter is to argue how Bergson's philosophy 
of life is shaped by his notions of intuition and duration. Before concentrating 
on the relations between intuition, duration and life, I shall attempt to inquire 
into Bergson's notion of the self and its relation with freedom. In Time and Free 
Will, Bergson deals with the self as a totality of two components. One is the 
superficial self that is limited by the conceptual language, habits, and rules of 
the society. Thus, the superficial self signifies our social side. The other is the 
fundamental self that transcends the structures of social life and enables us to 
be aware of the reality of dynamic life. Thus, the fundamental self signifies our 
conscious life. In other words, the fundamental self is our free side that moves 
us away from the domination of social life towards the inner free life. 
Secondly, I shall study Bergson's examination of freedom and his criticisms on 
determinists' and free will defenders’ approaches to the problem of freedom. 
Bergson's notion of freedom is closely related with his notion of duration. That 
is, according to him, free acts are directed by the creative power of duration. 
Free acts spring from our fundamental self that has unlimited possibilities to 
create its direction to act. Finally, I shall focus on Bergson's philosophy of life 
and make clear his notions of life and reality. In the investigation of Bergson's 
notion of life, I will mainly concentrate on its continuous and creative 
characteristics. That is to say, his concept of life cannot be held as independent 
from duration and his philosophy of life can best be explained through his 
method of intuition. Intuition does not conceive life with concepts and 
symbolizations which stem from language, logic and several other structures, 









INTUITIONISM OF BERGSON 
 
Intuition is the philosophical method of Henri Bergson and in Introduction to 
Metaphysics; he elaborately examines this notion as a unique way which 
enables us to grasp absolute reality. In this work, Bergson draws out two kinds 
of knowledge, namely, relative and absolute knowledge. In this chapter, I will 
first try to present these two ways of knowing in the light of An Introduction to 
Metaphysics. Then, I will also make an investigation of evolution of intuition. In 
this regard, I will put forward the relation of intuition with instinct and 
intellect. Finally, I will concentrate on the notion of intuition as being a 
philosophical method.  
2.1. Two Ways of Knowing 
Throughout the history of philosophy, many philosophers have defended that 
there are two ways of knowing. The first one is knowing partially and 
relatively; the second one is knowing completely and absolutely. Bergson calls 
these aforementioned ways as (i) the way of analysis and (ii) the way of intuition.  
According to the distinction drawn out by Bergson, while we are just capable 
of moving around the object by the first way, by following the second way we 
have the power of “enter[ing] into it”4. I will try to clarify the contrast as 
                                                          
4 Henri Bergson,  Introduction of Metaphysics,  p.1 
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follows. Through analysis, we take a narrow observation position, and the 
point of view that we develop is bound to that position. In other words, by this 
method, we are distanced from the focused object and see it from a particular 
perspective. Because of the constraint of the particular perspectives, the 
knowledge that we attain by the first way is doomed to be relative. On the 
other hand, the way of intuition is independent from the perspectives of any 
position. In this way, we grasp the knowledge of the object in itself by 
participating in the interior experience of it. So, this participation allows us to 
witness immediately the change, evolution and movement of the object from 
the inside. That is, by the act of intuition we feel sympathy with every states of 
the object and this sympathy paves the way for absolute knowledge. In short, 
according to Henri Bergson, intuition is the simple experience of sympathy, 
namely going into an object and grasping its uniqueness and peculiarity. Let 
me state the distinction between the two ways in his own words. 
It follows that an absolute can only be given in an intuition, while all the 
rest has to do with analysis. We call intuition here the sympathy by which 
one is transported into the interior of an object in order to coincide with 
what there is unique and consequently inexpressible in it. Analysis, on 
the contrary, is the operation which reduces the object to elements 
already known, that is, common to that object and to others.5  
Bergson explicitly distinguishes relative and absolute knowledge by using 
appealing examples.  For instance, according to Bergson, we can see “all the 
photographs of a city taken from all”6 the possible perspectives and also 
combine all the photographs of the city to see it entirely. Even so, this entire 
appearance of the city cannot be on a par with discovering the city by walking 
                                                          
5 Henri Bergson, “Introduction of Metaphysics”, Creative Mind, p. 189 
6 Ibid, p. 135 
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on its streets.7 Just with an active effort, which is an intuitional effort, the 
attainment of absolute knowledge may be possible. The path to absolute 
knowledge demands serious devotion not because the understanding of the 
reality as a whole is challenging, or simple analysis is inefficient and 
insufficient to grasp object itself. Rather, method of intuition as an indissoluble 
element of philosophy of life requires putting the prolonged and established 
conceptual structures aside.8 
Bergson gives various examples to clarify the contradiction between analysis 
and intuition. Apparently, with all these examples, he tries to rid his language 
of relativity and encourages the readers to make an effort to participate in the 
stories in his examples.  Instead of explaining the contrast by some concepts he 
tries to arouse sympathy with the heroes of the stories, exactly like in the 
example given below. 
[T]ake a character whose adventures make up the subject of a novel. 
The novelist may multiply traits of character, make his hero speak and 
act as much as he likes: all this has not the same value as the simple and 
indivisible feeling I should experience if I were to coincide for a single 
moment with the personage himself. The actions, gestures and words 
would then appear to flow naturally, as though from their source […] 
The character would be given to me all at once in its entirety, and the 
thousand and one incidents which make it manifest, instead of adding 
to the idea and enriching it, would, on the contrary, seem to me to fall 
away from it without in any way exhausting or impoverishing its 
essence.9 
Furthermore, analysis has a deep passion like the burning of the sun to 
embrace the focused object. To satisfy its own desire, analysis tries to wholly 
                                                          
7 Ibid, p.188  
8 That devotion on the road of reality will be addressed in the following parts. 
9 Henri Bergson,  “Introduction of Metaphysics”, Creative Mind, p. 187 
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grasp the object by separating it into its elements. Indeed this movement of 
analysis is an endless process. That is, each act of analysis is a kind of 
incomplete and imperfect translation of the real and thus, to attain the perfect 
knowledge of its object, analysis breaks every element of the object into an 
ever-growing number of new elements. Ultimately, the only thing it can reach 
is an “incomplete representation”; because no combination of the elements can 
give the wholeness of the object. On the other hand, intuition is a “simple act”; 
that is, it immediately provides the knowledge of the thing in its wholeness.10  
According to Bergson, analysis cannot be a method of knowing the absolute. 
This method contains the processes of separation, dismantlement, 
classification and an activity that always puts limits to its objects by taking 
different points of view. Thus it reconstructs the original forms of the objects 
with respect to these selected viewpoints. In other words, the method of 
analysis divides the reality, takes a part of it as its object and uses symbols for 
this particular object. This activity not only disregards the uniqueness and the 
unity of an object, but also can represent only some parts of the object by 
symbolization, and hence misrepresents it by missing out on the object itself. In 
addition, the act of symbolization transforms the mobile and indivisible 
character of the objects into a divisible and immobile form.11 
Moreover, according to Bergson, the essence of something cannot be 
understood by definitions and neither be explained by symbols. The nature of 
objects cannot be grasped by means of extracting its essential elements and by 
analyzing them in separation; absolute reality is a whole which is not 
                                                          
10 Henri Bergson, Creative Mind, pp.189-190 
11 “That is to say, analysis operates on immobility, while intuition is located in mobility or, 
what amounts to the same thing, in duration. That is the very clear line of demarcation 
between intuition and analysis.” (Henri Bergson, Creative Mind, p.211) 
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penetrable via logical examinations. Therefore, description and analysis leave 
us in the relative; thus, Bergson claims as follows: 
One recognizes the element by the fact that it is invariable. And it is 
invariable by definition, being a schema, a simplified reconstruction, 
often a mere symbol, in any case, a view taken of the reality that flows. 
But the mistake is to believe that with these schemas one could 
recompose the real. It cannot be too often repeated: from intuition one 
can pass on to analysis, but not from analysis to intuition.12 
As stated above, passing from analysis to intuition is not possible. The object 
of investigation cannot be clamped in an invariable definition, that is, a 
particular quality cannot be detached from the object itself as an invariable 
while the several other features belong to its nature. In other words, there is no 
invariable definition under which all instances of an object can be subsumed; 
rather only the intuition of the variability in an object itself can provide us its 
absolute knowledge.   Indeed, Bennett mentions two accounts that Bergson 
gives as the reasons to the question, why there is no “road from analysis to 
intuition”. The first one is the logical view stated in Introduction to Metaphysics 
and the second statement is the biological view that is indicated in Creative 
Evolution. 13 
From the logical viewpoint, there are two obstacles that block the road from 
analysis to intuition. (i) Analysis works with general concepts and all it can 
reach is a kind of general knowledge that represents common points of many 
things; thus it can never attain the knowledge of individual. (ii) The concepts 
of analysis are not parts of any object; they are artificial and not capable of 
                                                          
12 Ibid, p.212 
13 Bennett, Bergson's Doctrine of Intuition, p.48 
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identifying an object.14 In other words, concepts are various symbols 
indicating the similarity between objects. That is, to assume the concepts as if 
they were parts of the objects, is an erroneous approach.   
As mentioned before, Bergson regards analysis and intuition as two different 
ways of knowledge. From biological perspective, the contrast between 
intelligence and instinct seems parallel to the contrast between analysis and 
intuition. The relationship between intelligence and analysis is logically clear; 
the ability to make analysis depends on being intelligent. On the other hand, 
the relationship between instinct and intuition is not appreciable or logically 
understandable by everyone. That is why this issue should be examined in 
more detail. And so, we can apprehend why transition from analysis to 
intuition is not possible and clearly show that we must get rid of the methods 
and concepts of analysis to reach reality. However, to make this examination 
more reliable, we should first investigate the evolution of intuition by stating 
its relation with instinct and intelligence. 
2.2. Evolution of Intuition 
2.2.1. Intelligence and Instinct 
In Creative Evolution, Bergson puts emphasis on the point that intelligence and 
instinct are not completely different things that exist independent from each 
other.  According to Bergson, they are just the tendencies that arise from the 
same source.15 
For Bergson, in nature, originally there is not a significant difference between 
instinct and intelligence. The essential thing that differentiates these tendencies 
                                                          
14 Ibid, p.48 
15 Henri  Bergson, Creative Evolution, pp.152-153 
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is that they use different objects. He says that “[I]nstinct perfected is a faculty 
of using and even of constructing organized instruments; intelligence 
perfected is the faculty of making and using unorganized instruments.”16In 
other words, while instinct uses an organized living body, the faculty of 
intelligence constitutes and uses artificial objects. Yet, during evolution, 
instinct and intelligence develop, and hence the gap between them increases.  
Hence intelligence and instinct, which diverge more and more as they 
develop, but which never entirely separate from each other. On the one 
hand, the most perfect instinct of the insect is accompanied by gleams 
of intelligence, if only in the choice of place, time and materials of 
construction… But, on the other hand, intelligence has even more need 
of instinct than instinct has of intelligence; for the power to give shape 
to crude matter involves already a superior degree of organization, a 
degree to which the animal could not have risen, save on the wings of 
instinct.17  
According to Henri Bergson, the traces of instinct can be found in every part of 
the intelligence. In addition to this, instinct is embosomed with a “fringe of 
intelligence”.18 The idea that instinct is surrounded by intelligence causes so 
many wrong interpretations about the relationship between these two 
sentiments. The misunderstanding of this above mentioned statement results 
in the notion that there is a hierarchical difference between instinct and 
intelligence in terms of their excellence. Furthermore, this causes people to 
contemplate that these two faculties can be explained in respect to each other. 
However, Bergson asserts that instinct and intelligence are “complementary” 
since they are only different tendencies; they are originally interdependent. 
                                                          
16 Ibid, p.155  
17 Ibid, p.157 
18 Ibid, p.150 
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Even if Bergson points out that the instinct and intelligence arise from a 
common source, this does not mean that the faculty of instinct can be 
expressed by intelligible terms. According to him, instinct cannot be analyzed 
scientifically. Unlike the intelligence’s logical analysis of objects, instinct is the 
unconscious knowledge of an object, that is, the instinctive knowledge is 
innate.  
If instinct is, above all, the faculty of using an organized natural 
instrument, it must involve innate knowledge (potential or 
unconscious, it is true), both of this instrument and of the object to 
which it is applied. Instinct is therefore innate knowledge of a thing. 
But intelligence is the faculty of constructing unorganized that is to say 
artificial instruments.19  
Human intellect gives different meanings to life out of its needs. In other 
words, life comprises of human-made truths. In spite of this, the continuity is 
the essential characteristic of life, and intellect is not able to grasp this 
continuity, that is, intellect tends to understand the object as they are in a 
given moment, but not in their perpetual development in time. As Bergson 
points out: “Just as we separate in space, we fix in time. The intellect is not 
made to think evolution, in the proper sense of the word.”20 In contrast to 
intellect, instinct is closer to life.  
2.2.2. Instinct and Intuition 
Instinct, for Bergson, is “sympathy” and it turns its face towards life. However, 
it is not enough to grasp life, because it is without “reflective consciousness”. In 
addition, intuition, with its characteristic of reflective consciousness, goes 
beyond instinct. In Bergson’s words:  
                                                          
19 Ibid, p.166  
20 Ibid, p.179 
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Instinct is sympathy. If this sympathy could extent its object and also 
reflects upon itself, it would give us the key to vital operations –just as 
intelligence, developed and disciplined, guides us into matter. [.…] But 
it is to the very inwardness of life that intuition leads us –by intuition I 
mean instinct that has become disinterested, self-conscious, capable of 
reflecting upon its object and of enlarging it definitely.21      
Therefore, is the meaning of feelings or sensations identical to intuition? As it 
is clearly understood, for Bergson, intuition is not a feeling; it is a kind of 
instinct but more sculptured. If intuition is not primitive or natural as instinct, 
what has shaped it?  Is the answer mind, a creative energy, or something else?  
In his letter to Harald Höffdinng, Bergson states that instinct is able to know 
life absolutely but incompletely: “[H]uman intuition, which prolongs, 
develops and makes reflective what remains of instinct in man, is capable of 
embracing life more and more completely.”22  
The main question that we need to raise at this point is as follows; how does 
instinct transform into intuition? According to Bergson, the propulsive force 
that provides the transformation of instinct is intelligence. This is the reason 
why only human beings have intuition. Thus, Bergson claims that “it 
[intuition] thereby transcends intelligence that has come the push that has 
made it rise to the point it has reached. Without intelligence, it would have 
remained in the form of instinct, riveted to the special object of its practical 
interest, and turned outward by it into movements of locomotion”.23 But, this 
does not mean that intuition can be expressed by the terms of intelligence. 
Instinct is just affected by the mechanism of intelligence. That is to say, the 
                                                          
21 Ibid, p. 194 
22 Henri Bergson, “Letter to Harald Höffding”,Key Writings, p.367 
23 Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, p.195 
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roots of intuition are strongly connected to instinct just as Bergson says: “[A] 
glance at the evolution of living beings shows us that intuition could not go 
very far [….] intuition had to shrink into instinct”.24  
In Creative Mind, Henri Bergson opposes the traditional methods of 
philosophy. According to him intuition, la vision directe, is not alienated to time 
and the real. The essential nature of human intellect consists in acting for the 
pragmatic necessities. This is the reason why humans arrange their 
experiences in order to facilitate action and communication in social life. He 
also protests to socialize the truth by means of substituting the concepts for 
things and actions. There we must choose the hard way to penetrate the 
reality: the intuition rather than instinct or sentiment. Deleuze, in his work 
Bergsonism, presents the Bergsonian intuition as the fundamental method of 
philosophy. According to Deleuze, intuition is “fully developed method”; it is 
“neither a feeling or an inspiration, nor a disorderly sympathy.”25 
2.2.3. Intellect and Intuition 
The main purpose of this part of the investigation is to clarify the relationship 
between intellect and intuition. In the first phase of this study such a burning 
question arises: Are intuition and intelligence completely opposite to each 
other? In other words, does intuition involve or exclude the intellectual 
activity? Actually, these questions can be answered from two radically 
different interpretations26 of Bergson’s doctrine of intuition.  
                                                          
24 Ibid, p.200  
25 Gilles Deleuze, Bergsonism, p.13 
26 Margaret W. Landes, A Suggested Interpretation of Bergson’s Doctrine of Intuition, p.450 
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(i) According to the first interpretation, intuition is far from being intellectual. 
Intuition is a non-intellectualistic and mystical method of knowing; that is, 
it directly touches reality without the concepts of intellects. If this 
interpretation is correct, that is, if intuition is not an intellectual activity, 
intuition is not objective, but rather a mystical and subjective way of 
knowing. Actually this interpretation is not baseless because in The Sources 
of Morality and Religion, Bergson describes intuition as mystical.27 Can 
such a non-intellectual intuition embrace the whole nature of life or is it 
just able to apprehend the knowledge of our inner life? Yet, Bergson asserts 
that intuition is able to reach the knowledge of the self and absolute reality. 
If intuition is not intellectual, how can Bergson assume that intuition is able 
to grasp the absolute? Unless there is commonality of the intuitional 
experiences of people, how can we be sure that we really touch the reality?   
(ii) On the other hand, according to the second interpretation, intuition 
involves an intellectual activity; in a sense intuition is an intellectual way of 
knowing the reality. In An Introduction to Metaphysics, there are some 
expressions that put forth that intuition is not completely opposed to 
intellect; contrary to an opposition, intellect participates in intuitional 
activity. In other words, there is a collaboration between intuition and 
intellect. Bergson identifies intuition as “intellectual sympathy”28 and he 
also uses “intellectual auscultation”29 instead of intuition. Actually, intellect 
is the thing that makes intuition creative and perfect. According to Bergson, 
without participation of intellect, intuition is not so different from instinct. 
                                                          
27 Henri Bergson, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, p. 220 
28 Henri Bergson, An Introduction to Metaphysics, p.7 
29 Ibid, p.36  
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Yet, is such collaboration between intellect and intuition enough for 
validating the second interpretation?  
As a matter of fact, to accept or refuse any of the two interpretations is not that 
easy, since, as it is seen, in Bergson’s writings we can come across different 
propositions that support both of these interpretations. In this case, does 
Bergson fall into the conflict in his writings? Since to mount both pro-
argument and counter argument about an issue seems contradictory.  
W. Landes in pointing out these two aforementioned interpretations, proposes 
a third alternative. She neither chooses the first interpretation nor the second. 
Her third alternative contains both alternatives since she thinks that to 
eliminate one of the two views causes to miss the key points and the novelty of 
Bergson’s teaching.30  In a sense, to accept both views as correct is not a conflict 
because these two views represent two separate forms or possibilities of 
intellect. As we described before, first is a mechanical intellect that makes 
general concepts through the relations of things. On the other hand, the second 
form of intellect prefers to use unique and peculiar concepts for every 
particular thing rather than general concepts.  
In point of fact, Bergson does not deny the role of intellect in the quest of 
reality. As a matter of fact, what Bergson rejects is the intellect which is in the 
grip of our habits and tendencies. What Bergson rejects is the intellect that 
draws symbolic pictures and gives us relative knowledge. That kind of 
intellect is directed by our everyday needs, habits and tendencies. Is it possible 
to envisage another kind of intellect? Is it possible to pull intellect through its 
relations and incorporate it into the struggle to find reality?  
                                                          
30 Margaret W. Landes, A Suggested Interpretation of Bergson’s Doctrine of Intuition, p.456 
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One of the most important points to take into account while analyzing the 
studies of Bergson about the relation between intuition and intellect is the 
dominant philosophical movement of the period. In the second half of the 
nineteenth century, Positivist philosophy emerged in France, spread around 
Europe and also maintained its influence throughout the first half of twentieth 
century. The scientific developments in this period encouraged the positivist 
philosophers in so much that they insisted on explaining all phenomenal 
things by the methods of natural sciences.  They thought that the intellectual 
methods and scientific investigations were sufficient to understand life. That 
kind of effort would be a false intellectualism for Bergson. In fact, neither 
science nor intellect is the enemy for Bergson’s intuitive method; the thing that 
he opposes is false intellectualism. According to him there are two kind of 
intellectualism; “[…] the true, which lives its ideas; and a false intellectualism, 
which immobilizes moving ideas into solidified concepts to play with them 
like counters.”31 
It is true that, mechanical concepts cannot reach the essence of life and they are 
created by intellect; but, intellect is not identical with mechanism. Intellect is 
higher than mechanism; that is, it has a possibility in itself to get rid of 
mechanical categories, choose another way and be more creative.  
[T]he truth is that our intelligence can follow the opposite method. It 
can place itself within the mobile reality, and adopt its ceaselessly 
changing direction; in short, can grasp it by means of that intellectual 
sympathy which we call intuition. This is extremely difficult. The mind 
has to do violence to itself, has to reverse the direction of the operation 
by which it habitually thinks, has perpetually to revise, or rather to 
recast, all its categories. But in this way it will attain to fluid concepts, 
                                                          
31 Bulletin de le Sociélé Française de Philosophie, Vol. I, p.64. Quoted by  A. D. Lindsay, The 
Philosophy of Bergson, p.19 
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capable of following reality in all its sinuosities and of adopting the 
very movement of the inward life of things.32 
According to Bergson, there is an external and mobile reality that is in a 
constant state of flux. In the normal process of evolution, intellect has a 
tendency to break the mobility. Instead of participating in the changing states, 
our intellect substitutes reality with immobile representations. Hence, by 
stating this criticism, Bergson does not ignore the needs of practical life. 
Actually, the intellect has been evolved for the adaptation of living beings to 
their environment in order to survive in the face of potential danger. For the 
pragmatic needs and for the scientific investigations, intellect has to use 
concept, but not to escape the essence of life, it must participate in mobile 
reality. Thus, it should transcend the ready-made mechanical concepts and 
choose a harder way.33     
2.3. The Method of Intuition 
As it is mentioned above, intuition is the ultimate method for knowing the 
object itself as well as being the keystone of the Bergson’s philosophy of life. 
The problems of philosophy, especially metaphysical questions, can only be 
settled down only if the method of intuition is implemented to the object of 
investigation. To put it differently, the complete and proper understanding of 
an object requires all-comprehensive attitude which is released from the 
limitations of intellectual activity and its conceptual categories. Indeed, for 
Bergson, the traditional epistemological approach as well as their opponents 
has hitherto been confusing the apprehension of “practical life” and knowhow 
of sciences with grasping the object itself. For this reason, “the determinists 
                                                          
32 Henri Bergson, An Introduction to Metaphysics, p.69 
33 Ibid, p.68 
20 
 
and their opponents” are unable to unveil the most significant philosophical 
problems: 
But it may be asked whether the insurmountable difficulties presented 
by certain philosophical problems do not arise from our placing side by 
side in space phenomena which do not occupy space, and whether, by 
merely getting rid of the clumsy symbols round which we are fighting, 
we might not bring the fight to an end. When an illegitimate translation 
of the unextended into the extended, of quality into quantity, has 
introduced contradiction into the very heart of, the question, 
contradiction must, of course, recur in the answer.34 
Indeed, Deleuze argues that the hallmark of intuition as a method is that it 
enables access to the reality as its most pure and basic form since intuition, 
unlike intelligence, asks true questions to the objects and eliminates the ill-
defined domains of nature. In other words, intuition does not deal with any 
particular aspect of objects. Intuition neither intends to divide the indivisible 
nor transforms the variable into invariable. Rather, intuition finds out the 
origins of philosophical problems which stem from the erroneous 
identification of different natures, in other words, intuition redefines questions 
and untangles turmoil of reality which in fact serves as the purification of 
objects as well as subjects themselves. As Deleuze manifests: 
The means used by intuition are, on the one hand, a cutting up or 
division of reality in a given domain, according to lines of different 
natures and, on the other hand, an intersection of line which are taken 
from various domains and which converge. It is this complex linear 
operation, consisting in a cutting up according to articulations and an 
intersecting according to convergences, which leads to the proper 
                                                          
 
34 Henri Bergson, Time and Free Will, p.XXIII. 
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posing of a problem in such a way that the solution itself depends on 
it.35 
Moreover, in Time and Free Will and Creative Mind, Bergson stresses the 
misunderstanding of intellectualism under the light of his two notions viz. 
intuition and duration. For Bergson, intellectualism tries to conceptualize real 
time by cutting it out and breaking it into moments; however, the real time is 
indivisible pure duration. According to him, our intellect is on the wrong track 
since it accounts time as analyzable and measurable -through intellectual 
abstraction- just like space, that is, the fallacy of intellectualism arises from the 
identification of the incompatible natures of space and time. Accordingly, I 
suppose that it would not be a mistake to claim that intelligence is incapable of 
grasping the reality, since reality is a real duration by itself. Intellect is the 
activity of consciousness on nonliving matter. Despite that, intuition as an 










                                                          







MATHEMATICAL TIME AND DURATION 
 
Duration, stated by Henri Bergson, is a concept of time that comprises the 
succession of conscious states in an indivisible and immeasurable flow. In his 
work Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness, 
Bergson deals with our tendency of measuring time as we actually do spatial 
things. In his investigation of real time he analyzes such concepts as intensity, 
extensity, quality, quantity, multiplicity and number all of which are related to 
his study. Thus, this study is a deep and detailed investigation about time and 
its relations.  
In this chapter, I will try to investigate the confusion between intensity and 
extensity, quality and quantity, multiplicity and number that also lead the 
confusion between mathematical time and real time (duration). Then I will 
touch upon two qualitatively different realities, time and space. Next, I will 
discuss the distinction between mathematical and real time, and finally, will 
investigate the possibility of feeling duration. 
3.1. The Intensity of Conscious States and Magnitude of Material Objects 
In the first chapter of Time and Free Will, Bergson points out the confusion 
between the two so-called forms of quantity; intensity and extensity. While 
intensity pertains to the internality of conscious-being and it is unextended 
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and immeasurable, extensity is wholly related to the extended and measurable 
things. According to the proponents of the assertion, we can easily claim for 
the increase and decrease of both intensity and extensity, which is why they 
are called as magnitude. According to Bergson, drawing such a parallelism 
proceeds from our commonsensical misapprehension of intensity. Well then, 
how can we measure non-spatial things and regard intensities as being 
quantitative? The answer resides in our common-sensical acts that habitually 
draw an analogy between intensity with extensity and picture unextended 
things as extended. Bergson explains the interpretation that our common sense 
brings with these words:  
It is this qualitative progress which we interpret as a change of magnitude, 
because we like simple thoughts and because our language is ill-suited to 
render the subtleties of psychological analysis.36 
According to Bergson, space is a homogeneous medium, and when we try to 
understand heterogeneous inner states in such a plane, that is, with the 
language and concepts of the homogeneous space, we have to transform the 
conscious states into physical states that are wholly related to quantitative 
relations. However, intensities can only be compared according to their 
qualities. Trying to apprehend the inner states with regard to quantities is a 
habit of our intellect.  
We are thus led to believe that we translate the intensive into the 
extensive, and that we compare two intensities, or at least express the 
comparison, by the confused intuition of a relation between two 
extensities.37  
                                                          
36 Henri Bergson, “Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness”, p.13 
37 Ibid, p.4 
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Although common sense and scientific psychology treat sensations, feelings 
and passions as if they are measurable physical states, Bergson conversely 
indicates that the concerning states are related to our psychic aspects. Scientific 
psychology makes this mistake by imitating other sciences and talking about 
inner states just as talking about extensive and quantitative things. In addition, 
the mistake of common sense is the effort of using the language of spatial 
things for non-spatial states. That is, both common sense and scientific 
psychology try to reduce intensity to extensity. 
We generally use numbers and quantitative words to describe and also 
compare the things perceived in space. However, these kinds of quantitative 
relations cannot be established between psychic states38. It is a stubborn fact 
that intensity is affected by the physical conditions, and the quantitative 
changes of these conditions cause alterations in intensity, but this alteration is 
qualitative. 
While relating two things through their extensive magnitude, and also while 
talking about two intensities, the same expression such as “greater than” may 
be used, but it is not possible to use purely quantitative expressions such as 
“longer than” and “shorter than”. According to the intent and purpose, the 
first expression can gain two different meanings. One of these expresses a 
mathematical magnitude between the physical objects and the other one 
expresses qualitative differences in intensities. 
When we assert that one number is greater than another number or one 
body greater than another body, we know very well what we mean. For 
in both cases we allude to unequal spaces, as shall be shown in detail a 
                                                          
38 “The psychic states whose intensity we have just defined are deep-seated states which do 
not seem to have any close relation to their external cause or to involve the perception of 
muscular contraction.” Ibid, p.20 
25 
 
further on, and we call that space the greater which contains the other. 
But how can a more intense sensation contain one of less intensity?39 
Thus a correlation can be established between numbers and mathematically 
measurable things in terms of container and contained. However, between 
intensities there is no such relation. So our conceptualist ill-suited language is 
not capable of expressing the deep-seated sensations. Thus, is there any 
possible language that can successfully express the deep seated sensations? 
According to Bergson, art allows us to enter into the inner sensations through 
sympathy. Unlike our ordinary and static language, the language of the art 
and the way of expression it uses is very peculiar and dynamic. Bergson 
describes the peculiarity of art with the following words: 
Art aims at impressing feelings on us rather than expressing them; it 
suggests them to us, and willingly dispenses with the imitation of 
nature when it finds some more efficacious means.40  
Furthermore, it would not be wrong to say that in the first chapter of Time and 
Free Will, Bergson states that quantity is not applicable to the conscious states. 
Bergson points out the mistake that both intellect and language makes by 
trying to apprehend the consciousness through their own categories. In other 
words, the tendency of the intellect and language is to translate the 
immeasurable intensive things into measurable extensive things.  
Bergson indicates the confusion of quality and quantity as the main factor of 
the misapprehension of the conscious states. To mention of a less intensive 
sensation as contained in a more intensive sensation does not make any sense. 
The relation between sensations and the alteration of sensations cannot be 
                                                          
39 Ibid, pp. 1-2 
40 Ibid, p.16 
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assumed as in the relation between “contained” and “container”, such relation 
can only be established between extensional things and spatial objects. 
The other mistaken way of defining intensities is measuring their external 
causes and drawing a numerical parallelism between cause and effect, and 
between extensive and intensive. Bergson defends that we become aware of 
the affection of an intensity without realizing the cause of it. Intensities are 
immediately experienced things without figuring or calculating the external 
causes. Moreover, any enterprise that tries to apprehend intensity through the 
quantitative concepts or external causes can neither realize nor explain the 
alteration of intensities as “deep-seated psychic phenomena”. Because of the 
reason that the causes of the related intensities are purely subjective and not 
easily measurable, they cannot be explained by aforementioned methods.  
Whether the relation between a deep-seated intensity and external cause is 
close or not, it is obvious that their fields of activity are completely different. 
The former is related to the inner self and a conscious activity, the latter is 
related to the material things and mechanical activity. After making such a 
distinction between intensity and extensity we come up to a question as 
follows: although intensities are quintessentially qualitative why do we regard 
intensities as quantities? I will try to address this question in the following 
section. 
Bergson illustrates the distinction between quality and quantity in two parts. 
In the first part, he talks over the complex psychic states; and in the other, he 
examines the simple psychic states. In my analysis about quality and quantity, 
I would like to follow the line drawn by Bergson. In other words, after 
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elucidating the complex psychic states, I will touch upon the simple states that 
Bergson articulates.41 
3.1.1. Complex Psychic States 
Bergson specifies the complex psychic states by distinguishing them into two 
different kinds. First is the deep-seated psychic states and the other is 
superficial states (muscular sensation) that involve physical conditions. He 
clearly expresses deep-seated states by exemplifying some of these feelings 
and indicates the qualitative change of the related intensive feelings. For 
instance, he points out the progress of desire and its transition to deep passion. 
[An] obscure desire gradually becomes a deep passion. Now, you will 
see that the feeble intensity of this desire consisted at first in its 
appearing to be isolated and, as it were, foreign to the remainder of 
your inner life. But little by little it permeates a larger number of 
psychic elements, tingeing them, so to speak, with its own colour and 
lo! your outlook on the whole of your surroundings seems now to have 
changed radically.42 
Furthermore, Bergson analyzes the qualitative alteration of sensations of joy 
and sorrow, and then gives examples to illustrate the change of aesthetic and 
moral feelings. He speaks upon the sensation of pity, through indicating a 
gradual alteration of this moral feeling: “The increasing intensity of pity thus 
consists in a qualitative progress, in a transition from repugnance to fear, from 
fear to sympathy, and from sympathy itself to humility.”43 As he articulates, 
the deep-seated feelings have no or little connection with the external impacts. 
On the other hand, the muscular effort has closer relation to the external 
                                                          
41 Ibid, p.8 
42 Ibid, p.8 
43 Ibid, p.19 
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causes. Because of this relation, sensations of muscular effort seem as if they 
are magnitudes, and the gradual changes in them appear to be quantitative. 
However, when we consider the related sensations carefully, we realize that 
they do not occupy space and they are non-spatial psychic states. That is to 
say, the changes of these sensations are also qualitative just as the deep-seated 
feelings. 
We are thus led to define the intensity of a superficial effort in the same 
way as that of a deep-seated psychic feeling. In both cases there is a 
qualitative progress and an increasing complexity, indistinctly 
perceived.44 
3.1.2. Simple Psychic States 
Later on, Bergson, commenting on simple sensations, indicates that they much 
less depend on external causes. He divides these sensations into affective and 
representative sensations. While Bergson subclassifies affective sensations as 
pleasure and pain, he defines the representative sensations as the sensations of 
heat, light, weight that are affected by sensory data of physical world. In that 
respect, he first of all touches upon the relation between affective sensations 
and physical impressions. 
Common sense and science try to conceive the intensity of pain through the 
external causal factors, and agree with the existence of a close relation and 
parallelism between the measure of pain and the size of affected body. Just as 
pain, intensity of pleasure is seen as parallel to the bodily changes in terms of 
their magnitudes. However, it is not possible to mention an increase or 
decrease of the intensity of affective sensations. Physical factors cause 
qualitative change of sensations, but in terms of magnitude, there is no 
                                                          
44 Ibid, p.26 
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parallelism between physical causes and qualitative change. There is no 
translative language between quality and quantity. 
Our bodies react to the music that is heard, and harmonically accompanies the 
sound. Thus, the increase and decrease of sound influence our bodily reactions 
and sensations. Bergson terms these kinds of sensations as representative 
sensations. Every sensation in the state of flux changes qualitatively and 
becomes a different sensation. Although each sensation under the influence of 
external causes is like the shade of colors, they are interpreted as the same 
sensation that changes quantitatively.  
Bergson argues that the representative sensations have an affective character 
and, as a result, the qualitative alterations of representative sensations are 
understood as quantitative alterations. It is an undeniable fact that the 
outward factors affect our nervous system and by the effect of external factors 
we immediately feel a sensation. However, we do not immediately become 
aware of the changes in our nervous system. While the causal physical factors 
and also changes in our nervous system can be measured, our inextensive 
immediate sensations do not have mathematically measurable magnitude.45 
Yet, the intellect and our ill-suited language represent qualitative differences 
as quantity. 
Based upon Bergson’s point of view about intensity, we reach the conclusion 
that talking about a more intensive sensation does not signify “an increase of 
sensation” in reality because a sensation is qualitative and does not occupy 
any space. So when we regard sensation as a quality we can call it as “a 
sensation of increase”. Talking about sensation as an increasing quantity is just 
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making a mistaken inference.46 Bergson points out those mistaken inferences 
as follows: 
The fact is that there is no point of contact between the unextended and 
the extended, between quality and quantity. We can interpret the one 
by the other, set up the one as the equivalent of the other; but sooner or 
later, at the beginning or at the end, we shall have to recognize the 
conventional character of this assimilation.47 
Here, the representation of intensities are taken as two distinct forms; first is 
the representative states that represent the external causes and the other one is 
the self-sufficient states of consciousness that are not caused by any kind of 
external factor. Bergson describes these forms by the following words: 
The idea of intensity is thus situated at the junction of two streams, one 
of which brings us the idea of extensive magnitude from without, while 
the other brings us from within, in fact from the very depths of 
consciousness, the image of an inner multiplicity.48 
Then, if there is not any significant relation between extensity and intensity, 
how is it possible to speak of the multiplicity of each one? That is, how are the 
multiplicity of intensity and extensity distinct from each other? 
3.2. Two Kinds of Multiplicity 
As stated in the previous part, Bergson points out in the first chapter of Time 
and Free Will the misunderstanding of intensity by distinguishing quality and 
quantity. In the second chapter of Time and Free Will, he inquires the 
“multiplicity of inner states” and its difference from the multiplicity of 
number. In everyday life, the word multiplicity is often used to describe 
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quantitative multiplicity. He examines thoroughly the characteristic of our 
inner states and the distinction between inner sensations and external objects; 
and draws a parallel picture to this distinction which he terms as “qualitative 
multiplicity” and “quantitative multiplicity”. Similarly, to make clear the idea 
of duration, Bergson first aims to throw light on the multiplicity of conscious 
states of our life. 
Our habit of interpreting the qualitative subjective states as quantitative 
objective conditions causes us to understand unextended physics states as 
measurable extended objects. So, is it possible to signify qualitative states with 
numbers? It does not seem so, because just as Bergson indicates number 
implies spatiality.  
Bergson defines number as “a collection of identical units”49 - the units that are 
counted together must be identical or assumed to be identical. In order to 
count things together we must ignore their intrinsic differences. Through that 
kind of ignorance, we can call a group of sheeps as flock or a group of soldiers 
as army. For the purpose of counting, we isolate a soldier from reality and 
imagine him as identical with the others. At least one difference, the place 
which he occupies differs from the places of other soldiers that we imagine. 
Otherwise, the soldiers become one and same thing. That is to say, the parts of 
the units are juxtaposed in space. Because of being “a collection of units”, 
number is many; and being “a collection of the units”, it is one. In other words, 
number is “the synthesis of the one and many”.50 
When we first learn to count, every number refers to an external object that 
occupies a different location from other objects. Yet, after apprehending the 
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concept of number we give up the habit of counting by referring a signified 
object. According to Bergson the process of counting starts with signifying 
external objects, then the objects “become points” and in the end, the related 
points disappear and the image turns into “abstract number”.51 So, the abstract 
number becomes just a symbol that helps us to think back on the extended 
images. 
Is it possible to count without imagining the extended objects? Or is it possible 
to abstract number from space? During the process of counting, we think that 
the numbers are not dependent on space. That is to say, we believe that the 
numbers exist in duration rather than existing in space.52 Although we do not 
accept the dependence of numbers to space, we attribute a spatial location to 
the numbers while counting. Actually the durational moments that we count 
and add to each other do not refer to pure duration. “[E]very clear idea of 
number implies a visual image in space.”53 If so, why do we think numbers as 
if they are independent of space?  
As stated above, in the counting process we build up numbers by an 
indivisible process of our mind but, it does not mean that numbers consist of 
indivisible units. Divisibility is an attribute of extended spatial things. On the 
other hand, unextended and non-spatial states are indivisible. If we assert that 
number signifies unextended and non-spatial things, we must admit that 
number refers to indivisible states. However, our notion of number has the 
potentiality to be divided infinitely. So, the problem is that; how can a 
divisible concept signify indivisible states? Beyond all these problems, a 
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significant problem that we should consider is the possibility of counting inner 
states. As it is pointed out before, our inner states cannot be interpreted as 
qualitatively identical spatial objects.  Although there is a reflexive relation 
between our inner states, none of our sensation is identical with each other. 
That is to say, our inner states are not countable because we can only count 
qualitatively identical things. Hence, is it possible to mention multiplicity of 
inner states?  
While adding a number to the previous one, we conceive the multiplicity of 
the parts.54 On the other hand, Bergson points out another kind of multiplicity 
and distinguishes two kinds of multiplicities. The mentioned multiplicities are 
(i) the multiplicity of external objects “counted in space” and (ii) the 
multiplicity of conscious states that is not countable but “symbolically 
represented in space”. 55 
Physical objects are localized in space and, being so, they are divisible 
multiplicities. Although through the process of building up numbers we make 
an abstraction, thereby creating “ideal space” and juxtaposing the units into 
this imaginary space, we do not have to make such an abstraction for counting 
the material objects. As Bergson states, we already perceive the material 
objects in space. 
When we speak of material objects, we refer to the possibility of seeing 
and touching them; we localize them in space. In that case, no effort of 
the inventive faculty or of symbolical representation is necessary in 
order to count them; we have only to think them, at first separately, and 
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then simultaneously, within the very medium in which they come 
under our observation.56 
The psychic and mental states are indivisible and not locatable in space. The 
only way to count these non-spatial states is representing them symbolically. 
In the process of counting the qualitative senses we picture them as spatial 
images. Bergson illustrates this representation by regarding the perception of a 
bell sound. He talks about two alternatives to count the successive sounds of 
bell. The first is to combine the successive sensations of sounds with each other 
and form a series of rhythm. That kind of impression is totally qualitative. The 
second alternative that Bergson points out is the separating of sounds and 
placing them into a homogeneous ideal medium. In such a medium, the 
sounds are deprived of their qualities and lose their intensities.57 The question 
that arises at this point is whether this medium is spatial or temporal.  
Because of the intervals between gong sounds of the bell, these sounds seem as 
countable. Actually, things that we count are not sounds but intervals. That is 
to say, the ideal medium that is created for sounds is spatial. Bergson explains 
why time cannot be such an ideal medium: 
[A] moment of time, we repeat, cannot persist in order to be added to 
others. If the sounds are separated, they must leave empty intervals 
between them. If we count them, the intervals must remain though the 
sounds disappear: how could these intervals remain, if they were pure 
duration and not space? It is in space, therefore, that the operation takes 
place.58 
Bergson states that to count our all psychic states we need to form them as 
they are in space. 
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On the basis of two stated alternatives of counting Bergson reaches the 
conclusion that there are two kinds of multiplicities. The first is the 
multiplicity of material objects to which we can apply the concept of number. 
The second is the multiplicity of states of consciousness that must be 
represented symbolically and placed in ideal space in order to apply the 
numerical concepts to them.59 In other words, we can define the first as 
multiplicity of juxtaposition and the second as multiplicity of interpenetration. 
The material objects are juxtaposed in space one by one and cannot penetrate 
each other because they are located in different places. However, we cannot 
prove the assertion that impenetrability is the characteristic of physical objects 
because our perceptions and observations will never be capable of validate 
such an assertion. To make this kind of assertion we need a specified ideal 
space in which we may calculate all the possibilities. In other words, with the 
logical form of number we attribute impenetrability of the objects.60 We can 
say that this attribution is also a mistaken habit of our intellect. 
Furthermore, if the impenetrability mentioned above is a property of number, 
how can we count the feelings, sensations and mental states that penetrate 
each other? As argued before, although the psychic states penetrate one 
another, they are assumed as if they are located in different places in “ideal 
space”. So in the act of counting the psychic states, we assume that there is no 
penetration between these states. As we see in this process, impenetrability is 
not directly related with our perceptions; on the contrary, to make such an 
assumption is a logical necessity of number.61    
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Through the light of his expression about the counting process of conscious 
states, Bergson makes a distinction between our ordinary time concept and 
duration. In the process of counting, our conscious states are exposed to 
symbolic representation and their qualitative nature becomes impressed by 
external conditions. So, our immediate conscious states are reformed by spatial 
multiplicity. Bergson points out our ordinary understanding of time, that it is 
seen as a homogeneous medium in which our states of consciousness are 
juxtaposed just as they are in space. 
The multiplicity of our conscious states is heterogeneous and continuous; 
however, number is discontinuous and deals with completed states. If we strip 
the conscious states off symbolization, isolate them from the external world 
and consider the immediacy of them, we can realize that the multiplicity of 
conscious states differ from the numerical discrete multiplicity. Otherwise, 
these states stay in an assimilated “time” that is the medium represented by 
reflective consciousness.  
Although the pure duration is not representable, whenever we think and talk 
about duration or count the moments of it we unwillingly spatialize it. The 
habit of transforming time to space shows that there is a strong correlation 
between “time” and space. Hence, before analyzing Bergson’s concept of 
duration, it is necessary to talk about our concept of space and its relation with 
time. As mentioned above, Bergson describes our ordinary concept of time as a 
homogeneous medium that enables us to count our conscious states. In this 
regard, what is to be said of the relation that Bergson indicates between space 
and time as a medium? The main purpose of Bergson, while picturing the 
relation between our ordinary conception of time and space, is to show how 
pure duration differs from physical time. 
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3.3 The Relation between Physical Time and Space 
Bergson starts the examination of space by comparing Kantian and empiricists’ 
concepts of space. Kant considers space as an a priori intuition that enables us 
to perceive physical objects as spatial. Through this a priori condition, we 
perceive objects as spatial and in spatial relations with each other. Kant 
assumes space not as a property of objects but as a necessary condition for the 
intuition of objects. That is to say, Kant describes space as a pure intuition that 
can be separated from all sensational content; and so can be intuited 
independently. That is the reason why Bergson describes the Kantian concept 
of space as “an empty homogeneous medium”62 enabling us to make 
distinctions and abstractions to count.63 
However, empiricists do not agree with Kant’s assumption that we have an a 
priori intuition of space. According to empiricists, spatiality is the feature of 
“physical qualities”. Bergson declares that actually the empiricists’ assumption 
of space essentially is not dissimilar to Kant’s notion of space. The empiricists 
claim that our notion of space arises from the synthesis or co-existence of the 
sensations. Although empiricists would most probably reject, Bergson defends 
that the related act of synthesis includes an “active intervention of the mind”.64 
He points out the necessity of mind in forming extensity by combining 
inextensive sensations. 
Thus inextensive sensations will remain what they are, viz., inextensive 
sensations, if nothing be added to them. For their co-existence to give 
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rise to space, there must be an act of the mind which takes them in all at 
the same time and sets them in juxtaposition.65 
So the act of synthesis seems like Kant’s notion of “a priori form of sensibility”. 
As it is stated before, space is a medium that enables us to “distinguish a 
number of identical and simultaneous sensations from one another”.66Bergson 
agrees with Kant’s notion of space as being a homogeneous medium and 
existing independently. Space is the medium that enables us to separate and 
count the points of physical objects. Bergson claims that just like Kant, 
common sense has also the inclination of distinguishing the concept of space 
from the perception of extensity. Although intellect enables us to separate, 
count, abstract by means of space, it causes a mistaken tendency of 
considering time just like space. Considering time as homogeneous comes to 
mean to think the conscious states as juxtaposed in time like physical points in 
space. Consequently, through this consideration we abstract time from 
duration.67 However, duration is a flow that spreads from past to future. 
Duration is the continuous progress of the past which gnaws into the 
future and which swells as it advances. And as the past grows without 
ceasing, so also there is no limit to its preservation.68 
Bergson expresses that the envisioned thing as time is actually spatial. “[T]ime, 
conceived under the form of an unbounded and homogeneous medium, is 
nothing but the ghost of space haunting the reflective consciousness.”69 The 
material objects are exterior to each other and conceived within a 
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homogeneous medium, but the conscious states permeate one another 
successively and so, these states cannot be apprehended by considering them 
in a homogeneous medium. After all, our ordinary concept of time is a 
homogeneous medium just like space. In the next part, I will try to investigate 
how pure duration differs from the physical time. 
3.4. Homogeneous Time and Pure Duration 
Bergson mentions two possible concepts of time. One is the scientific time that 
is divisible, homogeneous and formed by the act of mind. The other is the real, 
concrete time which is called as pure duration. While the latter is independent 
of spatiality, the first is related to space. Bergson explains pure duration with 
these words: 
Pure duration is the form which the succession of our conscious states 
assumes when our ego lets itself live, when it refrains from separating 
its present state from its former states. For this purpose it need not be 
entirely absorbed in the passing sensation or idea; for then, on the 
contrary, it would no longer endure. Nor need it forget its former states : 
it is enough that, in recalling these states, it does not set them alongside 
its actual state as one point alongside another, but forms both the past 
and the present states into an organic whole, as happens when we recall 
the notes of a tune, melting, so to speak, into one another.70  
Bergson draws an analogy between a melody and the life of a living being. Life 
with its past, present and future states, is an inseparable whole just like a 
musical melody that is harmonical unity of notes. Like the notes of the melody, 
our past and future states melt into one another. If the rhythm of the melody is 
distorted, we immediately become aware of the qualitative change. Thus, we 
recognize that the distortion or change of the flux of rhythm or duration is not 
quantitative. Through this analogy Bergson aims to show that we are able to 
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conceive the succession of the parts of the qualitative harmonious whole. As 
the notes of a melody, the states of consciousness are qualitatively distinct, and 
a change in one part affects the whole. However, we, in social life, choose a 
way of symbolization (such as language) for our inner states of consciousness 
and project them to space. The constitution of an understanding about inner 
states – including feelings, sensations and dispositions – in space means to 
grasp intensity through the medium of extensity; in this regard, the inner 
states become juxtaposed in the same like the material and extended objects. 
Our ill-suited language has a tendency to consider each state of consciousness 
as isolated and static like the physical objects in space. Our language is just 
able to describe the quantitative changes; it can identify neither psychic states 
nor duration. Bergson claims that when we try to talk over an order of 
succession in duration, we automatically conceive it as simultaneous and 
project it as juxtaposed in space.71 The succession of conscious states is a 
“succession without distinction”; that is, not succession, but simultaneity 
creates distinction between these states. However, the states of consciousness 
are not lined side by side; rather, they are harmonically added to one another 
and they are parts of a successively organized whole. 
[P]ure duration might well be nothing but a succession of qualitative 
changes, which melt into and permeate one another, without precise 
outlines, without any tendency to externalize themselves in relation to 
one another, without any affiliation with number: it would be pure 
heterogeneity. 72 
As Bergson states pure duration is not measurable; however, we count time in 
our daily life; we set moments of time to a line, give names to them and count 
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them. If we conceive moments like this and do not go beyond this habit and 
mediation we cannot realize duration. According to Bergson, to perceive 
duration in its immediacy, we should avoid the symbolic language that 
mistakenly represents duration as a measurable quantity. 
In our ordinary life, we conceive time as a combination of moments that are 
imagined as being external to each other. The time which we measure and 
consider as a homogeneous medium is physical time. Moreover, the time that 
we refer in daily life and science uses in its calculations is this physical time. 
On the other hand “real time”, duration is continuous experience that is 
perceived by our inner consciousness. Bergson states the difference between 
physical time and duration with the following words: 
Granted that inner duration, perceived by consciousness, is nothing else 
but the melting of states of consciousness into one another, and the 
gradual growth of the ego, it will be said, notwithstanding, that the time 
which the astronomer introduces into his formulae, the time which our 
clocks divide into equal portions, this time, at least, is something 
different: it must be a measurable and therefore homogeneous 
magnitude.73 
Bergson claims that our ordinary act of measuring time is solely the act of 
counting simultaneities.74 Beyond this act that is directed by intellect, there are 
conscious states that evolve in duration. If we strip our ego off the 
symbolization of language and give up counting time in a moment, the thing 
that will remain is pure heterogeneous duration, indivisible process. The 
general mistake in conceiving time is the confusion of real space and real 
duration. We habitually try to apply a quantitative structure of space to the 
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conscious states of our inner life. Here is how Bergson describes this ordinary 
habit with his own words: 
There is a real space, without duration, in which phenomena appear 
and disappear simultaneously with our states of consciousness. There is 
a real duration, the heterogeneous moments of which permeate one 
another; each moment, however, can be brought into relation with a 
state of the external world which is contemporaneous with it, and can 
be separated from the other moments in consequence of this very 
process. The comparison of these two realities gives rise to a symbolical 
representation of duration, derived from space. Duration thus assumes 
the illusory form of a homogeneous medium.75 
As it is understood from the explanation of Bergson, the time that we speak of 
is divisible and homogeneous that actually refers to space rather than 
duration. Bergson analyses the concept of motion to make the related 
confusion clearer. Although motion is an indivisible process, when we 
consider motion as if it is homogeneous, we unwillingly fasten it up to the 
expansion of space. Bergson invites us to imagine a moving object from one 
point to another. When we think the movement of an object just within the 
relation of the points that it has passed over, we reduce the motion of the 
object to space. 
Furthermore, just like our habitual act, science eliminates the process of 
movement, just considers the places that the moving object has occupied and 
structures a line by combining the points and, finally, represents this 
illusionary immobile line as though it is motion. The essential point that we 
skip while talking over motion is that it is “a process which occupies 
                                                          
75 Ibid, p.110 
43 
 
duration”76. Only with a mental synthesis do we become able to sense the 
impression of motion and continuity. 
[D]uration and motion are mental syntheses, and not objects; that, 
although the moving body occupies, one after the other, points on a 
line, motion itself has nothing to do with a line ; and finally that, 
although the positions occupied by the moving body vary with the 
different moments of duration, though it even creates distinct moments 
by the mere fact of occupying different positions, duration properly so 
called has no moments which are identical or external to one another, 
being essentially heterogeneous, continuous, and with no analogy to 
number.77 
Physical objects fall along a line in homogeneous space and are external to 
each other. On the other side, duration has no place in the composition of 
space. It is completely related to our consciousness that is composed of the 
moments of duration. To imagine the multiplicity of the successive states of 
duration in a homogeneous medium does not signify any reality. These states 
are just real for our consciousness. 
Bergson claims that during sleep our consciousness is far from counting time; 
and we rather live in real duration and feel the qualitative character of 
duration. On the other hand, when we are awake, our consciousness returns to 
the ordinary habit of measuring time that is not related with duration, but 
space.78  
The notion of homogeneous time is just “the symbolical image of real 
duration”79. Our ordinary thinking and language deceive us by translating the 
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quality into quantity, and the unextended into extended. Even though we deal 
with discrete (numerical) multiplicity and pass over or eliminate the quality of 
the psychic states, they exist despite all efforts of our ignorance. If so, what 
kind of feeling is this that realize duration and if duration is something which 
is lived, is it identical with life or is it a part in the composite of life? 
Time as duration is originally heterogeneous; and until the moments of 
duration are symbolically substituted, time cannot be regarded as 
homogeneous. That is to say, before such a substitution we have the feeling of 
quality and duration. As mentioned before, through language and intellect we 
symbolize quality with quantity. As prerequisite for constructing the quantity 
of the states of duration, firstly we need to feel the quality of it.  
[W]ithout this interpenetration and this, so to speak, qualitative 
progress, no addition would be possible. Hence it is through the quality 
of quantity that we form the idea of quantity without quality.80 
When we resist the flux of duration and activate our intellect, we start to 
consider our conscious states as identical elements that are lined in space. 
Thus, we disturb the dynamic progress, and the qualitative multiplicity turns 
into quantitative whereas heterogeneous duration turns into heterogeneous. 
Bergson describes these processes by the following words: 
In a word, our ego comes in contact with the external world at its 
surface; our successive sensations, although dissolving into one 
another, retain something of the mutual externality which belongs to 
their objective causes; and thus our superficial psychic life comes to be 
pictured without any great effort as set out in a homogeneous 
medium.81 
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According to Bergson, by an effort of eliminating the artificial symbolization 
and construction we can experience real duration. If we try to concentrate on 
duration by separating the moments of it and assume as if they are identical, 
we, as a matter of fact, become condemned to the rules of artificially 
constructed time and life. To intuit the real duration we should go with the 
immediate flow of it like listening a piece of music without selecting the notes; 
rather, participating in the harmony of the whole performance. 
Actually, experiencing and participating in duration come to mean 
experiencing and participating in the real flow of life. In the next chapter, I will 



















SELF, FREEDOM AND PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE 
 
Are we aware of our entire self? Do we feel ourselves to be free? Are the future 
acts of a person determined by his/her previous acts? Is it possible to predict 
the future acts of a person? What are the characteristics of a free act? How far 
is reality from our experiences? Is it possible to conceive life in its immediacy? 
If it is so, what is the way of it? 
In this chapter, I will investigate the answers of these questions to explicate the 
main concepts of Bergson’s philosophy of life. In this respect, I will first touch 
upon Bergson’s notion of self and its relation with freedom. Then I will try to 
put forward Bergson’s investigation on freedom, and his analysis and 
criticisms about deterministic views. Finally, I will try to lay emphasis on the 
notions of life and reality to make clear Bergson’s philosophy of life.  
4.1. Two Kinds of Self 
As parallel to the distinction between qualitative and quantitative multiplicity 
or homogeneous time and duration, Bergson makes a distinction between two 
sides of the self. One is the superficial self and the other is the fundamental self. 
In the previous chapter, I intended to investigate the inadequacy of our way of 
thinking and language while expressing the states and sensations that we gain 
through intuition. Intuition enables us to participate in the process of dynamic 
47 
 
life that cannot be represented by the words of static and divisible world. 
Then, is it possible to create another language that is able to represent the 
states, feelings, senses, and also the process of aforementioned dynamic life? 
To conceive such a language that is far from using concepts and categorizing 
can appear to be impossible, because every state and feeling is unique, and so, 
we need unique words for each of these unique states and feelings. Still it 
seems possible to form a less conceptual language to express unique states 
more successfully. Bergson is well aware of the difficulty of expressing such 
states, and to overcome this difficulty, as stated earlier, he uses a peculiar 
language and makes use of many illustrations from inside of life that enable 
the readers to participate in the experiences in his examples. 
In social life, we acquire ordinary thinking, conceptual language, social 
structures and also habits that actually limit our perception of life. Each 
conceptual structure or habit instills in us with its own perspectival view and 
disrupts our connection with the wholeness of life. That is to say, we are 
imprisoned by our habits, language and society. So we can make an inference 
that in our daily life, on the social side, our freedom is also imprisoned.     
The side that is imprisoned by social life is our superficial self. On the other 
hand, the side that goes beyond the social construction and to the freer level of 
life is our fundamental self. That is to say, while superficial self signifies our 
social life, the fundamental self signifies our conscious life, and in that state we 
become aware of psychic states and inner life. In other words, the fundamental 
self (free self) is conscious of duration while the other one is the impersonal 
self in social life.82 The social self is like a wrong representation of the 
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fundamental self which is reflected to our daily life. It is “the shadow of the 
[fundamental] self projected into homogeneous space”.83 
[B]elow the self with well-defined states, a self in which succeeding 
each other means melting into one another and forming an organic 
whole. But we are generally content with the first, i.e. with the shadow 
of the self projected into homogeneous space. Consciousness, goaded 
by an insatiable desire to separate, substitutes the symbol for the reality, 
or perceives the reality only through the symbol. As the self thus 
refracted, and thereby broken to pieces, is much better adapted to the 
requirements of social life in general and language in particular, 
consciousness prefers it, and gradually loses sight of the fundamental 
self.84 
But, because of pragmatic needs, consciousness generally acts with the desire 
of separation, uses symbols for reality and contends with the social self, and 
hence it “gradually loses sight of the fundamental self.”85 At this point, 
Bergson also adds that the fundamental self can be reawakened with a 
vigorous effort. That is an effort of insulating the inner states from the 
homogeneous time, so that the inner states can obtain their mobility again. 
By the postulation of two kinds of self, Bergson does not mean that the 
personality is divided into two parts. It is one and the same self that, on the 
one hand, involving the inner states, perceives life as a unity while on the 
other hand, perceiving life as a series of distinct moments. In this regard, it 
would not be wrong to take the two selves as two different levels of the self 
that it is possible to pass from one level to the other: the distinction does not 
originate from a hierarchical superiority of the fundamental self to social; yet 
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they are essentially incompatible. In brief, these two selves are not reducible to 
each other. 
Actually the social self is the superficial and common that we share with 
society.  To communicate with other individuals, we need to use common 
concepts and language. Each of us, being a member of society, create 
languages, rules, laws and many other concepts to fulfill the demands of daily 
life in a practical way. But later, these created concepts seize control of the 
fundamental self, thus capturing its freedom. Consequently, we start to 
explain our inner sensations with common words; we use common words 
such as love, fear, sadness, anger to express our inner states. Thus, we lose our 
peculiarity and uniqueness, so as to become just a composition of society. 
In social life, because of the fact that we are imprisoned in language and social 
rules, we become alienated with the dynamic life. We conceptualize the inner 
states, those of which we acquire by intuition, and then we transform these 
dynamic characteristics into a static condition. According to Bergson, people 
mostly live with their superficial self as being unaware of true freedom and 
lose sight of their fundamental self that is hidden behind the conscious states.86 
Therefore, we need to ask whether it is possible to act freely in social life; and 
if it is possible, then, we need to show in what way this is so. 
In other words, the social self rises to the surface with clear-cut states while the 
fundamental self comes to light in a dynamic and organic whole in which the 
states permeate into one another. The social self is the substitutive 
representation of the real self that is more adapted to our language, intellect 
and other components of social life. Yet, to be adaptive to the inner states such 
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as emotions and senses, that are inexpressible with our ordinary concepts and 
language, require a desirous effort. 
According to Bergson, these two sides of the self are able to grasp two 
different sides of reality. The social self enables us to get the reality of material 
world. On the other hand, the fundamental self enables us to access the reality 
of the life process. In other words, the first one deals with the reality of being 
and the latter deals with the reality of becoming.87 Through evolution we have 
become more dependent on society and we are mostly not free and not aware 
of our inner self. We generally live with our social self, and so, with the social 
side, we have a tendency to put ourselves out of our ordinary life. 
For Bergson, our real self is the fundamental self. But, because of the external 
factors, we move from real self, and our perception severs its connection with 
duration thus becoming dependent on the spatial medium. Through this 
movement we gain habits such as separating, counting, and conceptualizing. 
And so, with these habitual acts we turn to society from our inner lives. 
[T]he moments at which we thus grasp ourselves are rare, and that is 
just why we are rarely free. The greater part of the time we live outside 
ourselves, hardly perceiving anything of ourselves but our own ghost, a 
colourless shadow which pure duration projects into homogeneous 
space. Hence our life unfolds in space rather than in time; we live for 
the external world rather than for ourselves; we speak rather than think; 
we “are acted” rather than act ourselves. To act freely is to recover 
possession of oneself, and to get back into pure duration.88 
As Bergson states above, we cannot act freely in the deterministic and 
pragmatically shaped social life. The cause-effect relation has become an 
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inseparable part of our way of thinking. In spite of this dependency to the 
external and static world, Bergson points out the possibility of free self that 
could be revealed with a tremendous effort.89 The superficial self makes us 
aware of a reality that is shaped by concepts, laws, language and habits; on the 
other hand, the free (fundamental) self enables us to become aware of the 
reality of the world in which states and moments are in a heterogeneous flux. 
The effort that enables us to get into the flux is the effort that breaks the chain 
of language, laws, concepts, and habits of social life, and gets rid of space. That 
is to say, this effort turns its face to the pure reality and gives up the 
substitution of it.  
In brief, the social self is more impersonal and more related to the external 
world in which the artificially constructed things such as language, laws 
prevail. That is to say, the social self is obedient to the external world, while 
the fundamental self is sine qua non of free will. 
4.2. Freedom 
At the beginning of the third chapter of Time and Free Will, before explicating 
his concept of freedom, Bergson first compares the perspectives on freedom of 
two opposite systems of nature, dynamism and mechanism. According to 
dynamism, organic forms of nature cannot solely be explained with the 
mechanical laws. Beside the laws that direct matter, there is a reality of facts. 
For dynamism, laws are just the symbolizations of the reality. On the other 
side, for mechanism, laws are the true realities that combine specific facts.90 
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Bergson describes the contradiction between dynamism and mechanism with 
the following words: 
[T]he believer in dynamism thinks that he perceives facts which more 
and more elude the grasp of laws: he thus sets up the fact as the 
absolute reality, and the law as the more or less symbolical expression 
of this reality. Mechanism, on the contrary, discovers within the 
particular fact a certain number of laws of which the fact is thus made 
to be the meeting point, and nothing else: on this hypothesis it is the 
law which becomes the genuine reality.91 
Mechanism tries to arrange facts under laws and through the related laws, 
attempts to determine future actualities among possibilities. That is, 
mechanism calculates the effects of an action, but it makes this by abstracting 
and staticizing the things in homogeneous space. For mechanism, future 
events can be predicted by the previous states and laws. On the contrary, 
dynamism does not deal with arranging the notions in order to comprehend 
the relations between them or explain the facts by laws. 
Because of the fact that mechanism and dynamism describe the concept of the 
“simple” in two different senses, one of them ascribes a higher reality to the 
laws and the other to the facts. For mechanism, calculable and predictable 
things or states that are explained by laws are simple. According to its 
definition of simple, inertia is a simpler notion than freedom because it can be 
defined by laws of physics.92 However, for dynamism, human being has the 
immediate feeling of freedom. Contrary to freedom, inertia is not an 
immediate knowledge but a derived concept because inertia is defined as lack 
of motion. Hence, what is immanent to life is change and motion, and inertia is 
just an abstraction and far from being simple. That is to say, what can be 
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simple for dynamism are concrete facts. Consequently, according to the 
mechanistic view, human actions are determined and predictable. However, 
for dynamism, none of the actions of the human being can be determined 
through the laws; because acts of human beings are free and spontaneous.  
4.2.1. Physical and Psychological Determinism 
Bergson, by comparing dynamism and mechanism aims to show that his 
concept of freedom is based on the dynamic system. On the contrary, 
determinism is grounded on mechanical assumptions. Being a dynamist 
philosopher, Bergson ascribes a superior reality to the facts and illustrates how 
physical and psychological facts are arranged under the laws ascribed by 
deterministic systems.93 
Bergson points out two kinds of determinism: physical and psychological. He 
asserts that although the empirical proofs of these two determinisms seem 
different, psychological determinism is reducible to physical determinism. 
Physical determinism is based upon the mechanistic theories of matter, that is, 
these theories explain all the physical phenomena by the movements of atoms 
and molecules. In addition, according to these theories the change in our 
nervous system can also be explained by the movements of nerves and 
physical changes in brain. Thus, such an explanation means that the cause of 
all our ideas and feelings could be identified through the analysis of physical 
change. According to mechanistic explanations, existence of free act is not even 
a matter of discussion because this deterministic view purports to calculate 
and predict the following action of human being. 
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According to Bergson, what psychological determinism does is to determine 
the nervous changes, feelings, and ideas by grounding them on physical laws. 
Even though psychological determinists aim at explaining our nervous system 
by mechanical theories and to put forward supporting instances for their 
theories, Bergson states that causes and effects of conscious states can be 
explained neither by the movements of the nervous system, nor by other 
mechanical assumptions. As Bergson says: “To prove conscious states 
determined, we should have to show necessary connexion between cerebral 
and conscious states. No such proof.”94 That is, to make such a proof, it is 
required to show a parallelism between cerebral and conscious states. Bergson 
agrees that in some limited cases we can realize a correlation between physical 
events and mental states but these limited cases are not sufficient enough to 
prove the causes of mental states.95 
Determinist theories believe in the law of conservation of energy. According to 
this law, between the parts of physical phenomena there can be energy 
transfer, but the total amount of energy does not change; it neither increases 
nor decreases. On the other hand, Bergson indicates that to bring about a free 
act or thought, a strong force or energy is needed. So, the followers of 
determinist theories, and those who take the law of conservation of energy as a 
guide, automatically put the possibility of freedom away. 
According to Bergson, the law of energy-conservation is acceptable only for 
the systems in which a reserve to the prior states is available. That is, in such 
systems, it is not only possible to predict the future states, but also to deduce 
the prior states. Bergson states that most of the processes are irreversible, and 
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so these processes cannot be explained by the law of energy-conservation. The 
natural process of human beings and the change of conscious states are 
grounded on duration. Furthermore, to place the things that are in mobile and 
indivisible states to the specific time, and to try to deduce their prior states is 
impossible. Because every moment of a living being is unique in its process 
and the existence of same states at different moments is impossible.96 For 
Bergson, although the law of conservation of energy is only acceptable for 
mechanistic systems, to accept this law as if it is universal is a mistake of 
psychological determinism. According to him, this mistake is caused by 
confusing the mathematical time and real duration. 
As we are not accustomed to observe ourselves directly, but perceive 
ourselves through forms borrowed from the external world, we are led 
to believe that real duration, the duration lived by consciousness, is the 
same as the duration which glides over the inert atoms without 
penetrating and altering them. Hence it is that we do not see any 
absurdity in putting things back in their place after a lapse of time, in 
supposing the same motives acting afresh on the same persons, and in 
concluding that these causes would again produce the same effect. That 
such an hypothesis has no real meaning.97  
According to psychological determinists, present states of consciousness are 
necessitated by the previous states, but conscious states differ from each other 
qualitatively and cannot be deduced from one another.98 Bergson admits that 
there is a relation between these states, but it is not to be associated as a causal 
relation. 
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Bergson states that it is possible to guess the next action of our close friend, but 
actually this is not a prediction of her future. We deduce her following act 
from her previous action and her character. Character, ideas, and feelings, as 
being a part of a human being, mostly do not change suddenly, instead, they 
evolve dynamically. 99 Because of this reason our “prediction” sometimes 
becomes true. However, the reason why Bergson criticizes determinists is their 
precise claims about actions of human beings. Even if we had known and 
witnessed all events and all decisions in someone’s life, we still would not be 
able to grasp the changes in her inner life. What we do while expressing her 
history of life is just making a reconstruction of her life. Thus, our 
overconfident predictions are destined to remain as deductive assumptions. In 
this regard, I find it beneficial to re-express here that the states of inner life of a 
person are not expressible and not apprehensible by others. Hence, analyzing 
life, character, ideas and feelings of a person are never sufficient to make 
inferences regarding her following actions and decisions provably. 
Subsequently, Bergson, states three mistaken deterministic assumption of 
reflective consciousness: 
(i) The first is the supposition of intensity as quantity. Determinism 
defends that decisions, ideas, and actions of a person can easily be 
predicted in the light of her past decisions, ideas, and actions. 
Furthermore, determinists profess that the change of intensive states of 
a person can be calculated by the reason of the fact that her decisions, 
ideas, and actions are not independent from her intensity. However, as 
stated in previous chapter, Bergson indicates that intensity cannot be 
calculated as quantitative things because it is purely qualitative.  
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(ii) The second mistake is the substitution of concrete reality or dynamic 
processes of consciousness with physical symbols.100 Determinists 
abstract consciousness as involving all the past and future states of a 
person and they do not take notice of dynamic processes of 
consciousness. However, in consciousness, the states are in a succession 
and melt every moment into one another.  
(iii) The third and most fundamental mistake is the confusion of space with 
time. According to Bergson, because of their confusion of time with 
space, determinists think that it is possible to make prophetic 
predictions about the future decisions and mental states of a person 
relying on the mechanical methods. They make their prediction by 
measuring time, but the real time is dynamic, indivisible, and the 
moments of it permeate into each other. 
4.2.2. Free Act 
According to Bergson, rather than being predictable, free acts are new and 
they cannot be deduced from the past actions. His concept of freedom is 
closely related with his concept of time. Predictable acts do not exist in 
duration, but they appear in mathematical time. They can be calculated before 
they take place. On the other hand, a free act unfolds itself in duration, and 
participates in the flow of it. Although people in society, while their 
fundamental self being hidden from themselves, behave with their superficial 
self, their activities cannot be predictable like mechanistic or habitual actions.  
Freedom has been a fundamental issue of philosophy ever since the Ancient 
Greek thought, so Bergson is not the first philosopher who formulates the 
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problem of freedom. Thus, what I want to emphasize here is the peculiarity of 
his investigation about freedom. According to Bergson, human activities are 
directed by the force of real time. Just like real time, acts of human beings are 
indivisible and mobile. Thus, it would not be wrong to assert that acts of 
human beings are impregnated by duration. 
Free act is the act of the fundamental self – it is unpredictable and indefinable. 
It is indefinable because none of the existing concepts is able to describe it. 
Additionally, descriptive words and concepts only limit the meaning and 
power of free act.  
Bergson tries to solve the problem of free will by his concept of duration. 
According to him, neither determinists nor defenders of free will is successful 
in their approach of the problem of free will assume time as a homogeneous 
and extensive magnitude. By interpreting time as space, both fall into the same 
error. Through such interpretation, they assume human acts as completed 
definable states. That is, both of them ignore the dynamic nature of human 
acts which unfold themselves in the flow of duration. Actually, determinists 
and defenders of free will make similar assumption about acts of human 
beings. On the one hand, according to determinists “there is only one possible 
act corresponding to given antecedents”.101 Through this assumption they 
defend that we can know the past actions and also perfectly predict the future 
acts of a person. In other words, for determinists, the self is the combination of 
its states.  That is to say, a state is the cause or effect of another state. If a 
person acts like y after the act of x; y is the only option for the person. On the 
other hand, defenders of free will assert that there are several kinds of equally 
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possible acts that may follow up any given set of prior acts.102 Thus, for 
defenders of free-will, there are always some alternatives to choose for every 
situation, and so the person is free to make a choice between the 
alternatives.103 Bergson opposes to the perspectives of both determinists and 
defenders of free will because of the same reason that both of them suffer from 
the same mistake in supposing that either one possibility or a group of 
possibilities necessarily have to follow the given sets of prior acts. For Bergson, 
free act is not an act of choosing a direction from possibilities, but rather an act 
of creation. The self does not make choice between so-called limited 
possibilities; it rather creates its own future act. The action of the self is creative 
just as the musical piece of a musician or the painting of a painter. 
According to Bergson, most people do not recognize their freedom because 
they act habitually and mechanically. If a person wants to act freely s/he must 
participate in the creative process of life. 
While free acts originate from the fundamental self, the superficial self is 
determined by the laws and doctrines of the society and the environment in 
which people live. Bergson does not propose to ignore all the ideas and 
doctrines of the society. There are clearly some restrictive ideas and doctrines 
that curtail our freedom; but there are also some ideas that give us a possibility 
to create new ideas and feelings that participate in our personality.104 Bergson 
criticizes the methods of positivism, but does not ignore all the positivist 
doctrines. What he criticizes is to let the rules and doctrines dominate us and 
limit our ways of thinking. Then only then, we become mentally and 
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emotionally barren and limit our freedom. That is to say, Bergson is critical of 
the tendency to leave the fundamental self aside and continue to exist only 
with the static self.  
As stated before, the self that is expressed by referring to everyday language is 
just a shadow of the real self. On the other hand, the self that act as free is 
fundamental self. Any political or social mention of free act refers to the act of 
superficial self. Hence, the free act is actually the manifestation of fundamental 
self. 
To understand whether an act arises from the fundamental or superficial self, 
the relation between the act and the environment should be analyzed. The free 
act has no remarkable connection with the environment and society. Although 
there are some ideas that limit the self, there are also some significant ideas or 
senses that affect the whole of our soul. So what kind of significant and 
effective ideas or senses give rise to the fundamental self? A deep passion, a 
strong anger or an intensive pity change and pervade our whole personality. 
These kinds of feelings have little or no connection with the laws of society or 
systematic thinking. Each of these intensive acts arising from deep inside and 
covering the whole personality may be identified as free acts. 
In social life we communicate with other people with our superficial self; that 
is, neither we nor others can realize our real self. So how can we encounter the 
explosion and emergence of the fundamental self? Similarly, how can we be 
able to cognize the fundamental self which, as said earlier, we have not come 
across yet?  
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Bergson claims that we can get rid of this fictitious world and become free by 
turning back to the real and concrete self.105 To be aware of the fundamental 
self is only possible by focusing on our conscious experiences in duration. That 
is to say, if we switch to duration instead of the homogeneous time, and leave 
out our superficial self, we can realize our real personality and freedom; 
therefore, we can notice our inner states as living, and grasp the reality that 
reveals itself in pure duration. 
[T]here are finally two different selves, one [superficial self] of which is, 
as it were, the external projection of the other, its spatial and, so to 
speak, social representation. We reach the former [fundamental self] by 
deep introspection, which leads us to grasp our inner states as living 
things, constantly becoming, as free states not amenable to measure, 
which permeate one another and of which the succession in duration 
has nothing in-common with juxtaposition in homogeneous space. But 
the moments at which we thus grasp ourselves are rare, and that is just 
why we are rarely free. The greater part of the time we live outside 
ourselves, hardly perceiving anything of ourselves but our own ghost, a 
colourless shadow which pure duration projects into homogeneous 
space. Hence our life unfolds in space rather than in time; we live for 
the external world rather than for ourselves; we speak rather than think; 
we "are acted” rather than act ourselves. To act freely is to recover 
possession of oneself, and to get back into pure duration.106  
Additionally, as stated earlier, we cannot bring the fundamental self to surface 
accidentally. The rebirth of the self requires a great effort, and this action 
resembles a volcanic eruption. The self that lives in the social life is limited by 
language and the rules for adaptability.  In this process there is no free will; on 
the contrary there is automatism that “cover[s] over freedom”.107 As a result of 
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being compressed with automatism and being exposed to the oppression of 
language and rules; the deep-seated self breaks its crust with a strong and 
sudden passion.108 This passion is the desire of free life and of inner 
dynamism. 
As mentioned above, Bergson does not postulate two separate selves; the 
separation of the personality is just an abstraction. Briefly, there is only one 
self that changes its characteristics by the motivations or effects of the inner 
states and external factors. So it is not possible to talk about a conflict between 
the selves “because we are pleased to split the person into two parts so that by 
an effort of abstraction we may consider in turn the self which feels or thinks 
and the self which acts, it would be very strange to conclude that one of the 
two selves is coercing the other.”109 Thus, the two mentioned selves refer to 
our whole personality, and freedom arises from that unity. 
4.3. Philosophy of Life 
Duration, as the main concept of Bergson’s philosophy, stands against 
concepts that are used in positive sciences. The concept of duration is the sign 
of the dynamic process and creativity of life. Life, just like duration, is a 
continuous and indivisible flux. Actually, duration is not just time, it is also the 
essence of life. To live is to be in a continuous and creative process in which 
the states are not lined simultaneously, but are successively part of the 
continuous flow. So, what is the true nature of life? Is our ordinary intellect 
able to grasp life? 
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Life is not static and created. It is always in the process of becoming, and its 
evolutionary movement is continuous. As stated in the second chapter, 
intellect deals with static and divisible things or it translates and reforms 
indivisible as divisible. Intellect takes shape as an effect of evolution, and we, 
as intellectual and conscious beings, are part of evolution. Although, intellect 
is the effect and part of the process of life, it does not work congruously with 
the rhythm of life. Life, as a flux, is a in the process of moving and evolving. 
On the other hand, intellect works mechanically; that is, it constructs new 
concepts and isolated systems by the act of adding and dividing. Intellect has 
been evolved to be harmonized with the material environment. All the 
components of the universe such as the living beings, intellect, and even the 
states that we try to isolate exist in duration. Evolution as an enabler of the 
flux of life, is the power of continuity of duration.  Nothing in the universe is 
given, rather everything is in the process of becoming new. However, 
mechanism assumes things and states as if they exist as static in the present. 
This assumption is the main mistake of mechanism. 
The essence of mechanical explanation, in fact, is to regard the future 
and the past as calculable functions of the present, and thus to claim 
that all is given. On this hypothesis, past, present and future would be 
open at a glance to a superhuman intellect capable of making the 
calculation.110 
In Bergson’s philosophy, the concept of duration is not an empty metaphysical 
assumption. The idea of duration arises from the evolution of life. In that 
regard, Bergson points out that there is a close relation between biology and 
philosophy of life.111 While putting forward his philosophy, Bergson 
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investigates life itself. And so, he examines the relation between species. What 
he realizes in his studies is that there is a succession in the evolution of species 
like the succession of life.  
Bergson analyzes two twentieth century theories of evolution, one being Neo-
Darwinism, the other being Neo-Lamarckism. According to him these theories 
unwillingly fall into the same mistake while trying to understand the 
evolution among species. Neo-Darwinist explanation is based on mechanism 
that is, this theory supposes the pre-existing factors as the basis of evolution. 
On the other side, Neo-Lamarckism is based on finalistic account. Both 
theories miss out the succession among species, disregard the unforeseeable 
life forms, and deal with the present appearance, assuming that all factors that 
could affect the evolution. So, both ignore the possibility of novelty. However, 
future is always pregnant with novelty.  
According to Bergson, mechanism and finalism reduce the past and future to 
the states of present. On the other hand, in his supposition of the nature of 
evolution, Bergson does not treat living beings by external causes and avoids 
explaining them with linear and mechanistic terms. Living beings are in a 
continuous flux, therefore only understandable by dynamic terms of an open 
system.112 
Furthermore, life is not just an adaptation process to the external states; it also 
includes an internal evolution. 
Science has shown, moreover, along the whole evolution of life, the 
various consequences attending upon the fact that living beings must be 
adapted to the conditions of the environment. Yet this necessity would 
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seem to explain the arrest of life in various definite forms, rather than 
the movement the organization ever higher.113 
To define life as an adaptation process is an ignorance of the creativity of life 
because adaptation to the outer world means becoming harmonized with the 
things that already exist. That is, adaptation is not a creative but a mechanical 
process. Bergson characterizes life in terms of will. For him, life cannot be 
defined as psychological and intellectual faculties that are directed by a 
purpose. Bergson’s concept of will is far from the traditional will in the sense 
that psychology deals with. Moreover, Bergson opposes the deterministic and 
intellectualist concepts of free act that offers a freedom to choose among finite 
possibilities. On the other hand, Bergson’s concept of free act is a creative act 
of the new. Life involves the possibility of unpredictable novelty, and it never 
repeats itself. Life is creative because it is not oriented by a purpose. In 
addition, to define the life of an organism by an adaptation process would be 
an inadequate explanation. However, a living being is actually in a 
modification process throughout which it contacts with its environment while 
creating new structures. 
According to Darwin’s explanation of natural selection, nature selects fitter 
organisms and eliminates weaker ones. On the other hand, Bergson interprets 
evolution as organisms’ selection of environment. In the flux of life, every 
organism has the power to select and create new possibilities. The 
environment is not a pre-existing ground that organisms adapt to; instead, it is 
a changing phenomenon that evolves in accordance with the activity of the 
creation of organisms. 
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Most of the evolutionists explain the changing process of organisms with 
environmental effects and ignore their creative capacities. Bergson opposes 
this mechanistic explanation and points out to the active creation process of 
organisms. His concept of creative evolution is a becoming process in which 
organisms actively participate. 
As he states in his work Creative Evolution, Bergson opposes to the assumption 
of an essence behind life and all reality.114 Reality does not inhold such a 
substance that is the cause of all existence. For him, life is a dynamic flow in 
which existences are not static and deterministic states in a fixed way.  
Classical physics theoretically assumes the future positions of things by 
calculating their present positions. What it fails to recognize is that life is a free 
creating process with none of its states being calculable as if being part of a 
mathematical or geometrical system. Duration is the essence of life – i.e., life in 
its wholeness, is in a continuous state of becoming. Thus, it involves 
unpredictable possibilities, always creating the new. So how can a universal 
law be applied to the living organism? 
Bergson indicates that there is an unhalting continuity in the process of life. 
Also the development in organisms is a series of qualitative changes in the 
form of organisms; for instance, all the ages and periods of human life in 
which human beings continuously evolve. This process is not a process of 
annihilation. In other words, growing and getting old is not a process toward 
extinction, they are rather the periods of evolution.  
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[We] must no longer speak of life in general as an abstraction, or as a 
mere heading under which all living beings are inscribed. At a certain 
moment, in certain points of space, a visible current has taken rise; this 
current of life, traversing the bodies it has organized one after another, 
passing from generation to generation, has become divided amongst 
species and distributed amongst individuals without losing anything of 
its force, rather intensifying in proportion to its advance.115 
Whereas most of the evolutionist theories do not seriously take time into 
account, time is the core concept for Bergson’s creative evolution. While science 
creates isolated systems to give explanation about the evolution of life, 
according to Bergson, evolution is not static but mobile and creative. So, it 
does not seem possible to understand evolution with the classical methods of 
science. Even if we kept individuals under observation, we would not be able 
to reach precise results about their evolution because our observations would 
be limited and always remain so. In this respect, it is important to underline 
the point that the aim of Bergson’s study of evolution is not to create laws or a 
system that fits all the living beings and explain the causes of their acts. He is 
just interested in the pure activity of evolution. Moreover, he does not follow a 
reductionist approach in his study. 
Scientists, who work with isolated systems and trying to explain evolution by 
cause-effect relation, assume the acts of living beings as if they are linked 
together in a deterministic manner on a linear progress. However, according to 
Bergson, evolution is not a linear progress. Evolution is an undetermined and 
unpredictable process – that is its direction is not planned or created. By its 
inner impulse, evolution creates novelty throughout the course of life. 
[F]rom its [life] origin, it is the continuation of one and the same 
impetus, divided into divergent lines of evolution. Something has 
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grown, something has developed by a series of additions which have 
been so many creations.116 
So, how does the inner impulse cause such a creation?  Evolution is initially 
directed by an impulsion, but the progress of it is not restricted by a cause or 
an effect. Each of the evolutionist thinkers put forward one main concept that 
signifies the cause of the movement in the process of life. For instance, while 
for some materialist, this cause is itch, for Darwin it is natural selection and for 
Bergson it is vital impulse. In contrast to materialists’ and Darwin’s 
assumptions about the cause of evolution, Bergson brings up a mystical factor, 
élan vital as the driving factor of evolution. He describes élan vital as vital 
impetus of the reality of life. Furthermore, élan vital, which cannot be 
comprehended by intellect, logical concepts and science, is the ground of 
whole life. Each component of life is in the process of moving, changing and 
becoming. Intellect, science and any other mechanically constructed systems 
deal with static and unmoving things or states. However, reality of life is not 
static, that is so, it is possible to grasp it neither by intellect, nor by science. 
Élan vital brings movement and creativity to life – it is the spirit of the life. 
Initial impetus’ act of creating new novelties never ends. “[T]he life drive is 
like an eternally creative artist whose every gesture redefines the avant-
garde.”117 The life with its all unity develops by vital impetus. 
The driving factor of life process is just limited by the resistance of matter. 
However, the same resistance enables driving impulse maintaining the 
creativity.  
                                                          
116 Ibid, pp.60-61 
117 Bernard G. Prusak, Le rire à nouveau: Rereading Bergson, p.377 
69 
 
When a shell bursts, the particular way it breaks is explained both by 
the explosive force of the powder it contains and by the resistance of the 
metal. So of the way life breaks into individuals and species. It depends, 
we think, on two series of causes: the resistance life meets from inert 
matter, and the explosive force due to an unstable balance of tendencies 
which life bears within itself.118 
The resistance of matter is required for the continuity of creative evolution. 
Because of the obstacles of matter, evolution makes a great effort to be free and 
creative as much as possible.119 Being a part of evolution, organisms change to 
create a higher efficiency and become more independent. For Bergson, the 
initial impetus is an effort against the resistance of matter. Actually there are 
two directions that arise from the same impetus. One direction enables us to 
adapt our social and environmental situations, and the other helps us to 
eliminate our everyday habits. While the first one signifies our intellectual side 
and our adaptation to materiality of life, the second one signifies our 
intuitional side that turns its face to the inner depth of life and spirituality. 
These two directions continuously clash with each other, and as an effect of 
this clash new and divergent novelties are created. 
We generate energy by consuming organic substances through nutrition. That 
is, we borrow energy from foods that store it. Yet, how does the food that we 
eat, store energy? Bergson explains the process of storing up energy as follows: 
The process consists in using solar energy to fix the carbon of carbonic 
acid, and thereby to store this energy as we should store that of a water-
carrier -by employing him to fill an elevated reservoir: the water, once 
brought up, can set in motion a mill or a turbine, as we will and when 
we will. Each atom of carbon fixed represents something like the 
elevation of the weight of water, or like the stretching of an elastic 
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thread uniting the carbon to the oxygen in the carbonic acid. The elastic 
is relaxed, the weight falls back again, in short the energy held in 
reserve is restored, when, by a simple release, the carbon is permitted to 
rejoin its oxygen.120 
Bergson describes (i) the effort of accumulating energy and (ii) letting it to flow 
as two main requirements for evolution. The source of energy can be changed 
in the life process, but this does not mean that life will end. The only required 
thing is a source of energy; it does not matter which source it is. When the 
source of energy changes, all the circumstances and quality of life might 
change, but life will endure. Our body, psychology or our ways of thinking 
can change, but liveliness, movement and creation will continue. In its flow, 
life confronts so many obstacles that limit its creation, but its action never 
ends. That is, it continuously creates and always reinvents itself. 
According to Bergson, it is not possible to assume life as a complete and 
isolable phenomenon, because it is ever in the process of becoming and never 
reaches an end. Although it is not possible to consider life as an isolable 
system, science attempts to determine it by static concepts and definitions. 
Hence, there is a great mistake in this point of view because a definition could 
only be justified for entities or states, the realities of which are completed. 
Neither life itself nor its properties can be defined precisely. 
The course of evolution is complicated; that is, its movement does not follow a 
single direction. By the power of creativity, the movement of evolution 
spreads too many different directions. Bergson describes the movement of 
evolution like that of the breaking of a shell with its explosive power 
meanwhile resisting obstacles that it encounters. So, life consists of two 
conflictive components, the first being the creative and explosive force, and the 
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other being the obstacle of matter. In brief, life is not composed of static states 
but tendencies that create different directions through its process of becoming. 
Creative evolution actualizes itself in duration. Its creations cannot be 
represented as spatial distinct points. However, this does not mean that the 
evolution of life randomly chooses a direction. Its movement is harmonious 
with its continual evolution in duration and the limits that it encounters.  
Life is in an evolutionary process and continuous progress that cannot be 
grasped by our faculty of intellect. This is to say that the intellect is not 
competent to understand the evolutionary movement of life. Thus, life can 
only be apprehended by participating in its evolution. However, the human 
activity that sprouts from the intellect is “only partial and local manifestation 
of life”.121   
So, how is it possible to apprehend and participate in life? As stated above, 
none of the methods of science can be taken up as the method of this kind of 
apprehension; that is, another method is needed to plump to the depths of life. 
Actually, life is not such an apprehensible phenomenon by the categories of 
our understanding and the concept of intellect – it is something that must be 
lived. The reality of life can only be immediately lived by a direct vision, 
intuition that transcends the intellect and the methods of science. In other 
words, the true philosophy of life can be grasped by the immediate 
comprehension of intuition. However there is a crucial point that should be 
taken into consideration, as mentioned in the second chapter, intuition does 
not exclude intellect. What it excludes is the strict conceptual methods that 
intellect starts to use in its process. According to Bergson, life grows out of a 
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duality. On the one hand, as it was claimed before, life is formed by the 
pragmatic necessities that are ingrained to our intellects and so to our actions. 
On the other hand, life gains a different meaning with our actions in duration 
and with memory. In regard to Creative Evolution, human creativity can make 
sense, if life is experienced in both ways. When practical needs are considered 
on the one side, on the other side the continuity of life could be sensed. 
Bergson’s philosophy of life is constituted by his two main concepts, intuition 
and duration. Bergson describes his philosophy of life as true empiricism and 
true metaphysics122 that aims to investigate deeply the inner nature of life in its 
immediacy. Bergson criticizes the philosophical approaches which adopt the 
methods of science and uses scientific concepts. The problem with these 
approaches consists in the fact that while they try to describe life, they avoid 
getting into contact with the mobility of real life. In contrast to these 
approaches, Bergson’s philosophy sets a demanding task requiring an intuitive 
and non-conceptual way of grasping life by means of which we could come to 
grips with the inner core of our lives, and whole pulse of life. He uses intuition 
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Throughout this study, I have tried to shed light on Bergson’s three main 
concepts, namely, intuition, duration and life, and attempted at investigating 
these concepts in relation to each other. In doing so, I aimed at showing how 
Bergson’s philosophy of life is constituted.  
In this work, I also attempted to demonstrate that Bergson elaborates a 
philosophy of life which is far from the conceptual understanding of science 
and common sense. For Bergson, in my phraseology, the reality which is 
constructed by science does not correspond with the reality of life. In other 
words, the pragmatically-oriented concepts of science cannot explain the real 
flow of life. So, in order to overcome the deficiency of science in explaining life 
adequately, Bergson offers the method of intuition to grasp the real essence of 
life in its real duration (dureé réelle). That is to say, intuition is a method of 
knowing life in its natural and dynamic evolution. This method does not deal 
with grasping the separately located positions in space, but rather deals with 
conceiving the whole of reality by participating in the inner states of life.  
Thus, Bergsonian philosophy reminds us the qualitative character of reality 
that has been overshadowed by the quantitative terms and concepts of science. 
Moreover, the perilous influence of science on the understanding of reality is 
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not only to obscure the qualitative character of life, but, even worse than that, 
science transposes qualitative states into quantitative ones by conceptualizing 
and measuring them.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, intellect has adapted to matter throughout the 
evolution, as an effect of our desire to satisfy our everyday needs and 
necessities. As a consequence of this adaptation, we are able to form suitable 
concepts for material objects. The act of conceptualization that has become the 
habit of our everyday thinking is the natural result of the evolution of intellect. 
Nevertheless, according to Bergson, with a voluntarily effort, we still have the 
capacity to change the natural direction of the intellect and engage it in the 
activity of intuition. In other words, thanks to this effort, we can get rid of the 
habits of our intellect and become an active agent through participating the act 
of intuition.  
The intellect that is evolved in its natural process, conceives objects as well as 
states statically and with a limited perspective, thus rendering us only relative 
knowledge. Apart from intellectually constructed reality, Bergson points out 
another kind of reality, which is an inner reality of life. This reality is in a state 
of flux and cannot be apprehended by the immobile concepts of intellect. In 
contrast to the naturally evolved intellect, the intellect that eliminates 
habitually constructed mechanical concepts can participate in the effort to 
grasp reality. In other words, according to Bergson, there is a need to leave the 
mechanical act of our ordinary thinking and engage in the dynamic process of 
intuition, although it is hard to achieve this active involvement. Because, by 
doing so, the intellect can take an active role in the process of intuition so as to 
grasp absolute knowledge, as well as the knowledge of our conscious states.  
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In the third chapter, I presented examples from Time and Free Will about the 
emergence and qualitative transitions of some conscious states. These 
examples point out the mistake of science in assuming the conscious states as 
being juxtaposed in space like the material objects. According to Bergson, our 
conscious states are in a mobile and indivisible succession, that is, they 
permeate into each other.  They are related to our psychic aspects and can only 
be compared through their qualities. However, science and common sense 
constitute a numerical hierarchy between conscious states, and assume their 
change as quantitative. This assumption is a mistake arising from the 
confusion of quality and quantity. Science transforms the states of time into 
space, interprets quality as quantity and unextended states as extended spatial 
objects. Thus, science tries to simplify the qualitative states in order to facilitate 
their apprehension, but, in doing so, misses their real nature. 
According to Bergson, the conscious states are related to our inner self 
(fundamental self), and are qualitatively distinct from the external objects. 
Thus, it is not possible to draw a parallel between the multiplicity of conscious 
states and the multiplicity of external objects even if some inner states are 
affected by external causes. The multiplicity of inner states is not the same as 
the multiplicity of extended objects because inner states melt into one another 
in succession and form a continuous and dynamic reality. Indeed, the change 
of a conscious state transforms its whole unity. That is to say, an inner state 
cannot be considered as distinct from its unity in a definite moment. Conscious 
states are not located in space, but rather exist as an indivisible unity in the 
flow of real time.  
Bergson describes duration as the real time that is distinct from scientific time. 
Although scientific time is constructed by the act of the intellect, and is related 
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to spatial objects, duration is the real flow of life which is independent from 
space. In our daily life, we measure time, pick moments from it and symbolize 
them with the concepts of our ill-suited language. Actually, by taking space as 
a model, the intellect constructs the time that we conceive in daily life. The 
spatial time is homogeneous and divisible just like space –it is created to count 
simultaneities. On the one hand, duration is the real time that is perceived by 
our consciousness. The scientific time, on the other hand, is a symbolic 
representation of the real duration. In contrast to the mechanical characteristics 
of scientific time, the flow of duration is like the harmonious rhythm of a 
musical piece. Bergson rejects the identification of the scientific time with real 
time, and offers a rediscovery of duration. For him, the elimination of an 
artificially constructed representation of time will enable us to participate in 
the real flow of duration.  
In the fourth chapter, I first tried to examine the relation between self, freedom 
and life. Then I attempted to explain Bergson’s approach to philosophy as a 
way of life. In order to attain a proper understanding of the philosophy of life, 
I investigated the role of intuition and duration in the constitution of a 
philosophy of life.  
In Time and Free Will, Bergson concentrates on a twofold nature of the self, 
namely, the superficial self and the fundamental self. Whereas the superficial 
self is limited by language, concepts and society, the fundamental self 
transcends the limit of social constructions. Thanks to the power of the 
fundamental self, we are able to attain the conscious states and the flow of 
dynamic life. Thus, while the superficial self represents our social side that we 
share with society, the fundamental self represents our free inner side. In 
social life we create concepts, rules, language to interact with other people and 
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to fulfill our pragmatic needs. Nevertheless, in time, the created concepts take 
control of our whole personality, and eliminate our freedom. Hence, we 
become alienated from our free inner life. 
Freedom, for Bergson, is the release of oneself from the confines of social 
arrangements, language, logic and general concepts when it comes to 
subjective sensations such as love, hatred and fear. To eliminate these 
structures requires a great effort to retrieve the fundamental self from the 
dominance of the social self. In social life our freedom is under the great 
pressure of concepts and language that are actually constituted for the sake of 
pragmatic needs of society. Yet, under the effect of this same pressure, the 
inner side, being like an entrapped gas, breaks its crust and rises to the surface 
with a sudden desire – the desire of free life. That is, free acts that are 
indivisible and unpredictable arise from our fundamental self and participate 
in the flux of duration.123  
According to Bergson, to live free is to be in a continuous and dynamic 
process. Life is not a pre-created phenomenon, but rather a process of 
becoming. As being in the flow of duration, life cannot be apprehended by 
static concepts of our ordinary intellect. The essence of life can be grasped by 





                                                          
123 In other words, Bergson’s notion of freedom is related with his notion of time, and cannot 
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Bergson felsefesi, 19. yy ortalarından itibaren tüm Avrupa’da felsefeyi etkisine 
almış pozitivizme karşı devrimci bir niteliğe sahiptir. Fransız Devrimi’nden 
sonra meydana gelen gelişmeler, bilime olan güvenin artmasını sağlamıştır. Bu 
gelişmeleri takiben, pozitivizm teolojik ve metafizik yargıları aşma iddiasıyla 
ortaya çıkmıştır. Metafizik problemler pozitivist felsefe tarafından anlamsız 
bulunmuş ve bilimin çalışma prensibi örnek alınarak,  sadece deney ve gözlem 
sonucu elde edilmiş verilere dayalı, genelleme yöntemiyle çalışan bir felsefi 
sistem oluşturulmuştur. 
Pozitivizmin resmettiği bilim toplumsal ve insani olan koşulların ötesine 
çekilmiş, indirmeci yöntemle çalışan bir bilimdir. Böylesi bir anlayış insanı 
tüm maneviyatından ve sosyalliğinden soyutlayarak, onu doğa bilimlerinin 
yasaları çerçevesinde açıklamayı görev edinmiştir. 
Bu çalışmadaki temel amacım, Bergson’un statik olmayan, değişken ve 
akışkan iki temel nosyonunun, sezgi ve dureé’nin akış ve değişim içerisinde 
olan yaşamın felsefesini anlamaya nasıl muktedir olduğuna vurgu yapmaktır. 
Bilimsel metodlar, statik kavramlar yaşamın akışını anlamaya yetkin 
değillerdir. Bu çalışmada yaşamın akışını ve gelişim sürecini anlamaya yatkın 




Bu çalışmada genel olarak üç temel nosyon üzerine yoğunlaşıyorum. Bunlar; 
sezgi, süre (dureé) ve yaşam. Bu doğrultuda çalışmamın üç ana bölümünü 
sırasıyla bu üç nosyonla temalandırıyorum. Bu çalışmayı yaparken Bergson’un 
üç eserinden faydalanmaya çalıştım. Bunlar; Metafiziğe Giriş, Yaratıcı Tekamül 
ve Şuurun Doğrudan Doğruya Verileri. 
Bergson pozitivist felsefenin statik kavram ve konseptlerine ve kullandığı 
metoda karşı, felsefe ve bilim için iki ayrı metod önerir; bilimsel metod olarak 
analiz, felsefi metod olarak da sezgi.  
Çalışmanın ikinci bölümünde Bergson’un izafi ve bilimsel bilmeye metod 
olarak sunduğu analizi, mutlak ve felsefi bilmeye metod olarak sunduğu 
sezgiyi incelemeyi ve bu iki yöntemin temel farklılıklarını ortaya koymayı 
amaçladım. Buna ek olarak, gerçekliği dolayımsızlığı içinde kavramamızı 
sağlayan sezgi metodunun evrimsel gelişimini ve onun intelekt ve içgüdüyle 
ilişkisini inceleye çalıştım. 
Analiz metodu, odaklanılan nesneyi belli bir pozisyondan, sınırlı bir 
perspektiften anlamamızı sağlayan bir bilme metodudur ve bu yüzden, bu 
yolla elde ettiğimiz bilgi izafi bir bilgidir. Bunun aksine sezgi metodu bilgisine 
ermeye çalıştığı şeyi belli bir açıyla ele almak yerine, onun devinimsel sürecine 
dahil olarak, onu içerden bilmeye çalışır. Yani, sezgi bilgi nesnesinin 
hareketine ve değişimine eşlik eder. Bilgi nesnesine dahil olup onun tekliğini 
ve özgüllüğünü kavramaya çalışır. Bu anlamda sezgi bir duygudaşlık 
durumudur. 
Nesnesine dışarıdan bakan ve onu parça parça görmeye eğilimli analiz 
metodu önce nesnesi parçalara ayırır, bu parçaları kavramaya çalışır ve sonra 
da bu parçaları birleştirerek hakikate ereceği iddiasında bulunur. Bu işlemi 
yaparken ilgili nesne ve diğer nesneler arasında karşıtlık ve benzerlik gibi 
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ilişkiler kurarak nesnesini belli kategoriler altına yerleştirir ve onun 
özgüllüğünü göz ardı eder. Bu yöntem nesneye yeni ilinekler ekler, 
muğlaklığını ortadan kaldırmak için onu tasvirler, benzetmeler ve kavramlarla 
netleştirmeye çalışır, onu “o” olmayan şeylerle açıklamaya çalışır ama hiçbir 
zaman onu kavramaya muktedir olamaz. Kavramaya çalıştığı şeye 
yakınsamak için yeni kavramlar ve tasvirler kullanır ama bu yöntem sınırlı bir 
perspektiften çıkamaz ve izafi bilginin ötesine geçemez. Yani analiz metodu 
mutlak bilgiye ancak yakınsayabilir ama ona ulaşamaz. 
Bir şeyin mutlak bilgisine ise ancak o “şey” in kendiliğine dahil olunarak 
erişilebilir. Şeyin birlik ve bütünsellik içindeki yalın haline ve mutlaklığına 
ancak bir iç görü ile yani sezgi yöntemi ile ulaşılabilir. Dışarıdan bir bakış ile 
analiz, nesnesi üzerinde kullandığı sembolleri çeşitlendirerek bitmek bilmeyen 
tercümeler ve tasvirler yapar. Ne var ki, sonsuza doğru uzayan bu tercümeler 
ve tasvirler hep kusurlu ve eksiktir. Yöneldiği nesneyi daha önceden tanışık 
olduğu diğer nesnelerle ilişkilendiren analiz metodu söz konusu nesnenin 
yalın ve biricik haline dolayımsız yaklaşmaktan çok uzaktır. Analiz 
metodunun aksine ise sezgi, yalın ve dolayımsız bir bilme yöntemidir.  
Başka bir deyişle, analiz metodu durağan bir nesneyi, belli bir zamanda ve 
mekânda anlamaya çalışırken, sezgi metodu hayatı dolayımsızlığı ve 
akışkanlığı içinde, ondan belli bir kesit almadan, evrimsel sürecinin içinde 
anlamaya çalışır. Bergson yaşamın değişken gerçekliğini savunurken, mutlak 
bilginin imkânını reddetmez. Aksine mutlak bilgi yaşamın evrimsel sürecinde 
saklıdır. Mutlak bilginin kavranmasını sağlayan metodun, bir bilme yöntemi 
olarak ele aldığımız sezginin çalışma prensibini netleştirebilmek için onun 
evrimsel sürecinin incelenmesi gerektiğini düşünüyorum. Sezginin evrimsel 
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gelişiminin, Bergson’un iki farklı yaşam eğilimi olarak nitelendirdiği intelekt 
ve içgüdüyle etkileşimi içerisinde ele alınması gerektiği kanaatindeyim. 
Bergson intellekt ve içgüdüyü aynı kaynaktan doğan lâkin evrimsel süreç 
içerisinde birbirlerinden uzaklaşan iki farklı eğilim olarak tarif etmektedir. İki 
eğilimin aynı kaynaktan doğması, bir eğlimin diğer eğilime indirgenebileceği 
veya bir eğilimin diğer eğilimle açıklanabileceği anlamına gelmez. Bu iki 
eğilim de alet kullanma yetisine sahiptir. Bergson’a göre bu iki eğilimi 
birbirinden ayıran en temel şey birbirlerinden farklı objeler kullanmaya 
yönelmeleridir. Şöyle ki; içgüdü organik olarak organize olmuş doğal araçlar 
üretme ve kullanma yönünde, intelekt ise suni araçlar oluşturma ve kullanma 
yönünde yetkinleşmiştir. Bu yönüyle incelendiğinde, her ne kadar intellekt ve 
içgüdü arasında ciddi bir fark dikkatimizi çekmiyor olsa da, evrimin sonraki 
aşamalarında bu iki eğilim arasındaki farklılıkların dikkate değer bir biçimde 
büyüdüğünü ayırt etmek mümkündür. 
Tıpkı evrenin diğer bileşenleri gibi intelekt ve içgüdü de oluşlarını 
tamamlamamış, olmakta olan ve bu yüzden de kesin olarak tanımlanamayan 
yetilerdir. Ancak, evrim süreci içerisindeki tezahür edişleri incelendiğinde, 
yönelimleri ve işlevleri hakkında konuşmak mümkündür. 
İntelekt belli bir zaman ve mekândaki nesneyi mantıksal analiz yöntemiyle 
bilir. Evrim sürecinde zihin insan yapımı doğruları ve maddeyi bilme 
yönünde, analiz yöntemiyle çalışma kabiliyetini geliştirerek evrimselleşmiştir. 
İntelekt bir şeyin kendiliğini değil, o nesnenin diğer nesnelerle ilişkilerini, belli 
koşullar altında oluşabilecek sonuçları bilir. Yani hep bir öncülü vardır. 
İçgüdü ise yaşamın akışına daha yakındır ve yaşama içkin bilgiyi dolayımsız 
bir biçimde anlamaya doğal olarak yatkındır.  
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Her ne kadar içgüdünün yüzü, intelekte göre, yaşama daha dönük olsa da 
yaşamı kavramamız açısından yeterli değildir. Çünkü içgüdüsel bir bilme 
yansıtıcı bilince sahip değildir. Yani aktif bir bilinç hali içerisinde değildir. 
Tıpkı içgüdü gibi yaşama dolayımsız yaklaşan ama şekillenmiş ve aktif bir 
bilinç haline dönüşmüş, yaşamı bütünlüğü içerisinde anlamamızı sağlayan 
yeti sezgidir. İçgüdünün sezgiye dönüşmesini sağlayan etken ise intelekttir.  
İntelektin itici gücü olmasa, sezgi içgüdü olarak kalırdı. İşte tam da bu 
yönüyle, sezgi mistik değildir ve felsefi bir metoddur. 
Bergson’un sezgi metoduna dair yapılmış iki temel yorum vardır. Birincisi, 
sezginin zihinsel olmayan ve tamamen mistik olan bir bilme yöntemi olduğu; 
ikincisi ise sezginin mistik değil aksine zihinsel bir bilme yöntemi olduğu 
görüşüdür. Bu çalışmada bu her iki yorumun da Bergson felsefesinde nasıl 
çelişki yaratmadan var olabildiğini açıklamaya çalıştım. 
Aslında bahsi geçen bu iki yorumdan herhangi birini kabul edip, diğerini 
reddetmek hiç de kolay değildir. Çünkü Bergson’un eserlerinde bu iki yorumu 
da destekleyecek tabirlerle karşılaşmak mümkündür. Peki, bu durumda 
Bergson’un felsefesi bir çelişki içerisinde midir? Çünkü bu iki yorumu da 
destekleyici tabirlerin kullanımı pekâlâ bir çelişkinin işareti kabul edilebilir. Bu 
iki yorumdan her biri Bergson’un  intelekt kavramının iki formundan veya iki 
ihtimalinden birine referansla yapılmış yorumdur. İntelektin birinci hali 
mekanik olan ve nesneler arasında benzerlik kurarak onları genel kavramlar 
altında toplayan, evrimin doğal süreci içerisinde kendisini var etmiş halidir. 
İntelektin ikinci hali ise nesneler için genel kavramlar kurmak yerine, her bir 
nesne için tekil ve özgül kavramlar kullanan halidir. 
Bu yorumlara vurgu yapmadaki amacım Bergson’un hakikat arayışında 
intelektin rolünü inkâr etmediği gerçeğini ortaya koymaktır. Bergson’un 
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reddettiği insanın alışkanlıklarına ve eğilimlerine tabii olan, yöneldiği nesneler 
için sembolik çerçeveler çizen ve izafi bilgi alanında kalan intelekt formudur. 
Bergson’un reddettiği insanın pragmatik ihtiyaçlarını ve isteklerini 
gerçekleştirme yönünde gelişmiş, evrimin doğal sürecinde oluşmuş intelekt 
formudur. Peki, böylesi bir intelekt evrimin doğal süresi sonunda oluştuysa, 
başka bir intelekt tahayyülü mümkün müdür? Başka bir deyişle bu intelekt 
formunu bağlamlarından uzaklaştırıp, hakikati arama sürecine dahil etmek, 
onun formunu değiştirmek mümkün müdür? 
Bergson’a göre gündelik ihtiyaçlarımızı karşılama konusunda başarıyla 
evrimleşmiş intelekt aynı başarıyı yaşamın özünü, onun hareketli ve değişken 
yapısını kavramakta gösterememektedir. İntelekt ancak mekanik kavramları 
ve sembolik dili aşarak yani formunu değiştirip daha zor bir yol seçerek 
yaşamın akışına ve hakikat arayışına dahil olur. 
İntelekt ve içgüdüyle birlikte evrimleşen ve dönüşen sezgi felsefi bir metod 
olarak benimsendiğinde hakikatin saf ve kendinde halini idrak etmemizi 
sağlar. Sezgi nesneye yeni ilinekler ekleyerek onu yeniden ve yeniden 
şekillendirmek yerine, nesnenin kendinde neyse o oluşunu kavramak için 
çalışır ve ona dolayımsızca yaklaşır. 
Bu çalışmanın üçüncü bölümünde Bergson felsefesinin en önemli 
nosyonlarından biri olan dureé’yi incelemeye çalıştım. Bergson’a göre 
yoğunluk-genişlik, nitelik-nicelik ikilikleri arasındaki karışıklık zaman ve 
mekân nosyonlarını birbirine karıştırmış olmamızdan kaynaklanıyor. Bergson 
dureé kavramını zaman ve mekân arasındaki karışıklığı çözen bir kavram 
olarak sunuyor. Dureé birbirine nüfuz etmiş, iç içe geçmiş bilinç hallerinden 
oluşan sürekli bir akış halidir. Birbiri ardına sıralanmış, ayrık olayların toplamı 
değildir. Birbiri ardına sıralanmış ayrık nesneler ve durumlarla ilgilinen 
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zaman mekân örnek alınarak kurgulanmış, suni bir şekilde oluşturulmuş 
matematiksel zamandır. Yani, Bergson’un zaman fikri günlük hayatta aşina 
olduğumuz matematiksel zamandan farklıdır. 
Bergson bir bireyin yaşamı ile müzikal bir melodi arasında benzerlik kurar. 
Yaşam geçmişi, şimdisi ve geleceği ile birlikte tıpkı bir melodi gibi bölünemez 
ve harmoni içerisinde olan bir bütünlüğe sahiptir. Bir melodinin notaları gibi 
yaşamın geçmişi ve geleceği de iç içe geçmiş ve bütünleşmiş bir halde bulunur. 
Nasıl ki bir müzik eserinin notalarından birini eksilttiğimizde o eserin niteliği 
tamamen değişiyorsa, yaşamdan anlar çıkarttığımızda da yaşamın niteliği aynı 
şekilde değişmiş olur. Bergson’un bu benzetmeyle dikkat çekmeye çalıştığı 
şey, zamanın tüm anlarının birbiri içine geçmiş ve kaynaşık halde olduğu ve 
herhangi bir bölümü üzerinde yapılan değişikliğin zamanın bütününü 
niteliksel olarak değiştirdiğidir. Ne var ki, günlük yaşamdaki içsel 
deneyimlerimizi anlatmak için onları dil aracılığı ile sembolleştiriyor, onların 
zamansal boyutunu ihmal edip, onları mekâna indirgiyoruz. Günlük yaşamda 
kullandığımız kavramsal dil bir şeyi başka bir şey cinsinden anlatmaya, 
hareketli bir şeyi durağanlaştırmaya, niteliksel olanı niceliksel olana 
indirgemeye yatkındır. Böyle bir dil ne içsel yaşamımızın niteliksel 
değişimlerini ne de gerçek zamanın akışını anlatmaya muktedirdir. 
Zamanın gerçek akışını temsil eden dureé sürekli bir akış, bir varoluş halidir. 
Ne var ki, gerçek zaman ya günlük yaşamda ve bilimde kullanılan zaman 
kavramıyla karıştırılmakta ya da varlığı söz konusu dahi edilmemektedir. 
Bilimin veya klasik felsefenin kullandığı zaman kavramı ölçülebilir, 
bölünebilir temsili bir mekândır. Fakat gerçek zaman bilincimizin birliği içinde 
değişerek ve yaratarak süregelen ve tanışık olmadığımız yeniliklere gebe olan 
bir oluş halidir. 
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Bahsi geçen bu iki zaman kavramı şeyleri algılayışımızın iki farklı yolunu 
temsil eder; günlük yaşamda sıklıkla kullandığımız sınırlı yaşam algısı ve 
yaşamın bütünlüklü ve kesintisiz algısı. Birinci algı kişinin sosyal çevresine 
uyum sağlamak ve ortaklık kurmak için oluşturulmuş ve alışkanlığa 
dönüşmüş algıdır. Bu algıya sahip olan kişi zamanı –tıpkı mekân gibi– ardarda 
sıralanmış parçalar bütünü olarak kavrar. Böyle bir algı zihnin işleyişine, onun 
parçalı görme haline uygundur. İkinci algı ise zihnin alışık olduğu algı 
halinden sıyrılıp gerçek zamanı, onun akışına dahil olarak kavrayama çalışan 
algıdır. 
Bilimsel veya matematiksel zaman gerçek zamanı soyutlanıp deneysel 
düzleme aktarmış ve niceliksel olarak ölçülebilir hale getirmiştir. Yani bu 
homojen zaman gerçek zamanın soyutlanmış ve kavramsallaştırılmış 
kompozisyonudur. Somut zamanı, onun akış içindeki halini sabitleyerek, 
ondan anlık kesitler alarak bilmeye çalışır. Bilimsel zaman mekân düzleminde 
oluşturulur. Bunun aksine gerçek zaman ise yaşamın akışına içkindir ve ancak 
dolayımsız bir bilinç haliyle eşlik edilerek kavranabilir. Alışkanlıklarla örtülü 
gerçek zamanın sezgisi günlük yaşam gayeleriyle oluşmuş zaman algısından 
azad olunarak ortaya çıkartılabilir. Böyle bir kavrayış ancak dolayımsız bir 
tanıklıkla mümkündür. Söz konusu tanıklık dışarıdan değil, zamanın tam da 
içinden onun yaratımına katkı sağlayan ve onla birlikte evrimleşen bir 
tanıklıktır.  
Bergson’a göre gerçek zaman tam bir bilinç hali içerisinde sezilebilir. Tam ve 
açık bir bilinçle kişi seçim yapma ve yaratma gücüne erişebilir. Bilinç durumu 
bireyin bağımlı olduğu dış etkenlerden sıyrılmasını ve özgür eylemesini 
sağlar. Kendisini dışsal bağlamlarından arındırmış bir bilinç gerçek zamanın 
yaratıcılığını keşfe çıkar, ona dahil olur ve hürriyetine kavuşur. 
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Çalışmanın son ana bölümünde ise Bergson’un sezgi ve dureé kavramlarıyla 
biçimlenmiş yaşam felsefesine bir giriş yapmaya çalıştım. Sezgi, dureé ve 
yaşam ilişkisini incelemeden önce benlik (self) kavramını analiz etmeye ve 
özgür eylemi mümkün kılan benlik halini ve bunu nasıl mümkün kıldığını 
incelemeye çalıştım. 
Bergson’a göre sosyal ve asli (gerçek) olmak üzere benliğin iki farklı boyutu 
vardır. Sosyal benlik dille, kavramlarla ve sosyal normlarla sınırlanmış ve içsel 
yaşamımıza yabancılaşmış özgür olmayan tarafımızdır. Bütün bu konseptler 
ve dil insanlarla ilişkiye geçebilmemiz ve pragmatik ihtiyaçlarımızı 
karşılayabilmemiz için oluşturulmuştur. Sosyal benliğin aksine bizim özgür ve 
yaratıcı tarafımız ise dil ve kavramlarla sınırlanmamış asli (gerçek) 
benliğimizdir. 
Bergson benliğin iki yönünden bahsederken bir bireyin iki farklı kişiliğe sahip 
olduğunu kastetmez, söz konusu ettiği iki taraflı bir ve aynı kişiliktir. O, 
benliğin iki yönüyle,  iki farklı algılayış ve var olma tarzına işaret eder. Bir 
yönüyle yaşamı bütünlüklü bir şekilde algılayan ve onun içsel devinimine 
dahil olan bir benlik iken, diğer yönüyle ise yaşamı birbirinden ayrı anlar 
toplamı olarak algılayan, yaşamın akışının dışında kalan bir benliktir. Aslında 
bahsi geçen bu iki yön benliğin –birbiri arasında geçişi mümkün olan– iki 
farklı seviyesi olarak da tarif edilebilir. Fakat bu seviyeler arasında hiyerarşik 
bir derece farkı yoktur ve birbirlerine indirgenemezler. 
Sosyal benlik suni olarak oluşturulmuş ve toplumdaki diğer bireylerle 
paylaştığımız benliktir. Diğer bireylerle iletişime geçebilmek için ortak bir dile 
ve kavramlara ihtiyaç duyarız. Bu ortak dile ve kavramlara yalnız iletişim 
kurmak için değil aynı zamanda günlük ihtiyaçlarımızı karşılamak için de bir 
anlamda muhtacızdır. Fakat zamanla temel ihtiyaçlarımızı karşılamak ve 
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iletişim kurabilmek için oluşturduğumuz dil ve kavramlar bizim gerçek 
benliğimizi kontrol altına alarak hürriyetimizi kısıtlamıştır. Hatta kızgınlık, 
korku, üzüntü ve aşk gibi içsel duygulanımlarımızı dahi ortaklaştığımız ortak 
kavramlarla açıklar ve özgüllüğümüzü kaybederiz. Sosyal benlik etkisiyle 
dönüştüğümüz hal toplumun bir yansımasından ibarettir. 
Sosyal yaşam içerisinde edindiğimiz mantıksal analiz yöntemi, kavramsal dil, 
sosyal normlar ve bunlara bağlı olarak kazandığımız alışkanlıklar bizim yaşam 
algımızı kısıtlamaktadır. Edindiğimiz her bir kavram ve alışkanlık bize yeni 
bir perspektifi işaret eder ve yaşamın bütünlüğü ile olan ilişkimizin 
zayıflamasına neden olur. Bu durumda, günlük hayatta alışkanlıklara, 
kavramsal dile ve topluma tutsak olduğumuzu ve özgür edimlerde 
bulunamadığımızı söylemek yanlış olmayacaktır. 
Bergson, toplumdaki çoğu bireyin günlük ihtiyaç ve isteklerini gidermek için 
kullandıkları sosyal benliğin gölgesinden kurtulamadıklarını, gerçek 
özgürlüklerinden habersiz olduklarını, yaşadığını ve sosyal benliklerinin 
arkasında saklı kalan gerçek benliklerini fark edemediklerini savunur. Peki, 
dille, kavramlarla, sosyal normlarla çevrili gerçek benliği yüzeye çıkarmak 
mümkün müdür? 
Sosyal yaşam içerisinde asli benliğimiz yüzeyde değildir; sosyal benliğimiz 
tarafından örtülmüştür. Özgür eylem ancak asli benliğin yüzeye çıkmasıyla 
mümkün olur. Konseptlerin, dilin ve sosyal koşulların kısıtlamalarını ortadan 
kaldırmak gönüllü ve güçlü bir çaba gerektirir. Dışsal koşullarla bastırılmış 
asli benlik basınç altında sıkışmış bir gaz gibi patlama yaparak eyleme geçer. 
Sosyal benlik tarafından oluşturulmuş kabuğu kuvvetli bir arzuyla kırar ve 
yaşamın akışına aktif bir şekilde dahil olur.  
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Bergson Şuurun Doğrudan Doğruya Verileri’nin üçüncü bölümünde kendi 
felsefesindeki özgürlük kavramını ortaya koymadan önce, karşıt iki felsefi 
görüş olan dinamizm ve mekanizmin özgürlük perspektiflerini karşılaştırır. 
Dinamizme göre doğanının organik yapıdaki bileşenleri mekanik yasalarla 
açıklanamaz. Çünkü gerçekliğe indirgemeci bir tavırla yaklaşan bu yasalar 
gerçekliğin sembolik anlatımından başka bir şey değillerdir. Bu görüşün 
aksine, mekanizme göre yasaların gerçekliği tekil olguların gerçekliğinden 
üstündür. 
Mekanizm tekil olguları yasalar altında toplar ve bu yasalar aracılığı ile olası 
ihtimaller arasından gelecekte vuku bulacak olan olayları ve eylemleri doğru 
tahmin etmeyi taahhüt eder. Mekanizme göre muhtemel bir olay önceki 
durumlar gözetilerek ve yasalar aracığı ile hesap edilebilir. Mekanistik görüş 
tıpkı doğadaki diğer olaylar gibi insan eylemlerinin de belirlenmiş ve tahmin 
edilebilir olduğunu görür. Dinamizm ise olayları yasalara tabii olarak 
açıklama, önceki durumları karşılaştırma ve ihtimalleri hesaplama amacında 
değildir. Dinamizme göre ise insanın eylemleri yasalar yoluyla hesaplanabilir 
ve tahmin edilebilir değildir. Çünkü insan özgür ve doğal biçimde eyler. 
Mekanizmin ve dinamizmin özgürlük perspektiflerini karşılaştıran Bergson, 
kendi özgürlük görüşünün dinamik yapıda olduğunu vurgulamayı 
amaçlamıştır.  
Bergson’a göre özgür edimler yaratıcı ve yenidirler; geçmiş eylemlerden 
çıkarsanabilir, tahmin edilebilir veya hesaplanabilir değillerdir. Bergson’un 
özgürlük kavramı dureé kavramıyla yakından ilişkilidir. Tahmin edilebilir 
eylemler dureé’nin düzlemi içerisinde değildir. Hatta asli benliği sosyal 
benliği ile gölgelenmiş bir bireyin dahi eylemleri hesaplanabilir değildir. 
Ancak organik olmayan mekanik yapıdaki olaylar matematiksel olarak tahmin 
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edilip, hesaplanabilir. Özgür edim kendisini dureé’nin koynunda açar ve onun 
akışına dahil olur. 
Özgürlük Antik Yunan’dan beri felsefenin temel meselelerinden biri olmuştur. 
Yani Bergson özgürlük problemi üzerine yoğunlaşan ilk filozof değildir. Onu 
bu konuda özel kılan ise özgürlük, dureé ve yaratıcılık arasında kurduğu 
çarpıcı ilişkidir. Bergson’a göre insanın özgür edimleri hareketlerini gerçek 
zamanın yaratıcı gücünden alır. Tıpkı dureé gibi insanın eylemleri de akışkan 
ve bölünemezdir. 
Bergson özgürlüğün ancak sosyal benliği aşılması ve asli benliğin ortaya 
çıkarılmasıyla mümkün olduğuna vurgu yapar. Asli benliğin yüzeye 
çıkmasıyla doğan özgür edim tahmin edilemediği gibi tanımlanamaz da. 
Tanımlanamaz, çünkü var olan, bunca zamandır kullanıla gelmiş herhangi bir 
kavram onu tanımlamak için yeterli değildir. Özgür edimi tasvir etmek için 
kullanılan kavramlar onun içsel anlamını daraltıp onun özgüllüğünü ihmal 
eder. 
Bergson, yaratıcılıkla özgürlüğü neredeyse denk tutar. Ona göre, özgür olmak 
demek yaşamın dinamik sürecine dahil olmak ve yaratıcı olmak anlamına 
gelir. Özgür edim bir müzisyenin müzikal eseri ve bir ressamın resmi kadar 
yaratıcıdır. 
Bergson felsefesi yaşamın doğal ve içsel yapısını incelemeyi konu edinmiş bir 
felsefedir. Bu doğrultuda bilime adapte olmuş ve bilimin metodlarını ve 
kavramlarını kullanan felsefi yaklaşımlara karşı çıkar. Bu yaklaşımlar hayatı 
tarif etmeye çalışırken gerçek hayatın dinamik yapısını görmezden gelir. 
Bergson’un yaşam felsefesi ise yaşamın içselliğini sezgi metodu ile anlamaya 
çalışan felsefi bir yaklaşımdır. 
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Yaşam ne yaratılmıştır ne de statiktir. Yaşam tıpkı dureé gibi oluş hali 
içerisinde ve evrimsel hareketi devam eden değişimin ve canlılığın bizzat 
kendisidir. Yaşam içindeki hiçbir şey verili değildir, yaşama içkin olan her bir 
parça değişim içerisindedir. 
Bergson, yaşamın sadece dışsal koşullara adaptasyonu sağlayan bir süreç 
olduğu fikrine karşı çıkar.  Ona göre yaşamı bir adaptasyon süreci olarak 
tanımlamak onun yaratıcılığını inkâr etmek anlamına gelir. Çünkü adaptasyon 
yaratıcı değil, mekanik bir süreçtir. Yaşam sunulmuş ihtimaller arasından 
seçilenlerin gerçekleştiği bir zemin değildir. Yaşam tahmin edilemez 
yeniliklere gebedir ve kendini hiçbir zaman tekrarlamaz. Yaşam yaratıcıdır 
çünkü bir amaçla yönlendirilmemiştir. Yaşam söz konusu olan yaratım 
gücünü yaşam atılımından (élan vital) alır. 
Bergson yaşama hareketini veren élan vital’i yaşamın ruhu olarak nitelendirir. 
Yaşama içkin olan bu atılım gücü ebediyen yenilikler üreten bir ressam gibidir. 
Ne var ki böylesi bir yaratımın itici gücü olan élan vital maddenin direnciyle 
karşılaşır. Fakat yaşamın itici gücü karşısında direnç gösteren madde onun 
yaratıcılığını sonlandıramaz. Aksine onu yeni olana gebe bırakır. Maddenin 
direnci élan vital’in yaratıcılığının devamı için olmazsa olmaz bir koşuldur. 
Çünkü élan vital böylesi bir direnç karşısında gayret sarf ederek yaratır.  
Sürekli bir yaratım içerisinde olmasından dolayı yaşamı tamamlanmış bir 
süreç olarak tasavvur etmek pek mümkün görünmemektedir. Çünkü yaşam 
asla son bulmayacak bir oluştur. 
Sonuç olarak, Bergson’un yaşam felsefesi sezgi ve durée nosyonları 
çerçevesinde şekillenmiştir. Bergson gerçek metafizik olarak tabir ettiği kendi 
yaşam felsefesinin amacının yaşamın doğasını dolayımsızca araştırmak 
olduğunu belirtmiştir. Dolayımsız bir metodu seçen Bergson, bilimsel 
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metodları ve kavramları benimseyen felsefi yaklaşımları eleştirir. Çünkü ona 
göre böylesi yaklaşımlar yaşamın gerçek akışına dahil olmadan onu, dışarıdan 
bir bakışla tarif etmeye çalışırlar. Kavramsal bir dille yaşamı anlatma 
gayesinde olan felsefi yaklaşımlara karşın Bergson sezgi metodunu 
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